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CONTRACT
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Numerous statutes and the tort of wrongful dischargepur-port to
prohibit companies from retaliating against employee whistleblowers. However, whistleblowers often lose retaliationlawsuits
because these statutory and common law tort protections depend
upon a variety of nuanced factors, such as the employer for whom
the whistleblower works, the kind of wrongdoing reported, the
way in which the employee blew the whistle, and, under some
laws, the willingness of an administrative agency to investigate
the whistleblower's claim. Given these difficulties, this Article
explores an alternate route for whistleblower protection: enforcing
the existing contract protections that private employers currently
provide employees when they report misconduct. Rules recently
enacted by the major stock exchanges now require each publiclytraded company to publish a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics promising not to retaliate against employees. These Code
anti-retaliation promises potentially provide broader whistleblower protection than statutory and tort protections, and enforcing the Codes contractually could address the weaknesses of the
traditional remedies. This Article highlights the benefits of
breach of contract claims based on corporate Codes, addresses the
potential difficulties that whistleblowers may face when asserting
such claims, andpresents possible solutions to these problems.
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INTRODUCTION

The contract between an employee and an employer forms
the basis for much of employment law. 1 However, the parties
typically cannot form an agreement that has pernicious effects
2
on outside parties or that violates specific public policy norms.
For example, an employer cannot force an employee to commit
perjury or to evade jury duty in exchange for keeping a job or
accepting high wages. 3 Thus, "external" laws and public policy
contained in statutes and the common law set minimum terms
for employment relationships that limit the ability of employees and employers to reach agreements contrary to the public
4
interest.
Laws that protect employee whistleblowers illustrate the
limits external law places on the employment contract. Numerous statutes prohibit companies from retaliating against
certain employee whistleblowers, as does the tort of wrongful
discharge in most jurisdictions. 5 These anti-retaliation protections supersede any private ordering between parties, including an at-will arrangement, that would permit an employer to
fire or otherwise retaliate against an employee for reporting
misconduct. Legislatures and courts intend these prohibitions
to encourage private-sector employee whistleblowers and to deter corporate wrongdoing. When the law encourages whistleblowers to expose misconduct, society benefits from the reduction in dangerous and damaging conduct-conduct that likely
would not otherwise be disclosed if employees could rely only

I. See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Foreword: The Role of Contract in the Modern
Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003) ("A central
premise underlying modern employment law is that workplace relationships, at
bottom, are contracts."); Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment
Law, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 379 (2006) ("The employment relationship is governed largely by contract, but with a heavy overlay of 'rights': minimum terms
and individual rights that are established by external law and are typically nonwaivable.").
2. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 1, at 379; Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful DischargeLaw and the Search for Third-PartyEffects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1950-53
(1996).
3. See Petermann v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344 P.2d 25, 26-28
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (forbidding an employer from firing an employee for refusing to testify falsely); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (forbidding
an employer from firing employee for fulfilling jury duty); see also Schwab, supra
note 2, at 1950-53.
4. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 1, at 379.
5. See discussion infra Part I.
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upon an at-will employment arrangement that contained no
6
protection from retaliation.
However, these statutory and common law tort protections
often fail to protect employees sufficiently after they have
blown the whistle because of the law's "patchwork," gap-filled
approach. 7 Statutory whistleblower protection consists of numerous federal and state anti-retaliation laws that vary depending on the industry, the type of disclosure, and the individual to whom an employee makes a disclosure. 8 The common
law tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy provides similarly disjointed coverage and depends heavily upon
whether an employee makes a disclosure that fits narrowlydrawn "pigeonholes."9 Recent empirical evidence suggests that
such limited protections consistently fail to redress retaliation
against whistleblowers, in large part because whistleblowers
fail to fit their claim into the narrowly-drawn boundaries of the
law. 10

Assuming that a Congressional fix for this muddled landscape of statutory and tort protection remains unlikely, this
Article explores a counterintuitive type of whistleblower protection: contract law. Although it might be unexpected for corporations to protect whistleblowers by contract (hence the need
for statutory and tort protections), currently the vast majority
of publicly-traded companies publish a Code of Ethics or Code
of Business Conduct (hereinafter referred to collectively and interchangeably as the "Code" or "Codes") that promises protection from retaliation for any employee who reports any illegal
activity in good faith. The unqualified breadth of this promise
avoids many of the problems inherent in the current hodgepodge and nuanced regime of tort and statutory protection. Accordingly, whistleblowers who suffer retaliation by companies
that publish Codes could return to the core foundation of em-

6. See Schwab, supra note 2, at 1950-53.
7. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 19 (2002) (noting that corporate whistleblowers
were "subject to the patchwork and vagaries of current state laws"); see also Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley's Structural Model to Encourage Corporate Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1129-30.
8. See discussion infra Parts L.A & I.B.
9. STEVEN L. WILLBORN, ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
122-24 (4th ed. 2007) (discussing the "pigeonholes" of protection for wrongful discharge tort); see also Schwab, supra note 2, at 1954-56; discussion infra Part I.C.
10. See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis
of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65,
106-20 (2007).
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ployment law-the contract-and attempt to enforce their employers' anti-retaliation promises under contract law.11
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I summarizes the
traditional protections for whistleblowers contained in statutory anti-retaliation provisions and tort law, and then examines the weaknesses of the current approaches.12
Part II describes the recent trend to include antiretaliation protections in corporate Codes, which culminated in
2003 when the two largest U.S. stock exchanges, the New York
Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System ("NASDAQ"),
revised their corporate governance listing requirements. The
new listing standards mandate that every listed company publish a Code of Business Conduct and Ethics protecting employee whistleblowers from retaliation. Also, Part II asserts
that the breadth of these newly-required anti-retaliation promises could provide important substantive and procedural benefits to whistleblowers, as well as significant normative benefits
to society.
Part III recognizes that the potential protections found in
corporate Codes need to be enforceable in order to obtain these
benefits. Unfortunately, courts inconsistently permit whistleblowers to bring claims based on anti-retaliation promises.
This problem for whistleblowers results from the courts' tendency to evaluate Code claims under the analysis developed for
claims based on employee handbooks. A rigidly-applied "handbook doctrine" undermines contract protection for whistleblowers because of three difficulties: the extreme level of specificity
required for Codes to be enforceable; the difficulty of demonstrating sufficient employee reliance on the Code provision; and
the likelihood of employers including an at-will disclaimer to
undermine the contractual effect of an anti-retaliation promise.
Part IV asserts that this rigid application of the handbook
doctrine fails to recognize a significant difference between the
typical handbook case and these new Code anti-retaliation provisions. Unlike handbooks, Codes serve an important role in
an overall corporate governance structure that includes en-

11. Other commentators have briefly mentioned that Code anti-retaliation
provisions might provide anti-retaliation protections to whistleblowers.
See
DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 182-86 (2d ed. 2004). However, this Article is the first
to explore the issue thoroughly.
12. See discussion infra Part I.
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couraging employees to report corporate misconduct. Relying
on this important distinction, Part IV presents both doctrinal
and regulatory solutions to address the difficulties posed by the
handbook doctrine.
Lastly, Part V identifies some drawbacks to relying solely
on contract claims to protect whistleblowers from retaliation.
To be clear, this Article does not advocate dispensing with
tort and statutory protections or relying purely on unregulated
contracts to protect whistleblowers; rather, the Article asserts
that government-mandated Codes could serve as a valuable
supplement to current protections. 13 In doing so, the Article
joins a recent academic trend to re-examine private ordering in
the employment relationship, including why parties agree to
terms and conditions of employment that "exceed legally proscribed minimums or fall outside the scope of public regulation." 14 In this case, corporations choose, in their own self13. As I note below, contract protection often would provide more benefit than
the current patchwork system, but less benefit than an ideal (currently nonexistent) comprehensive anti-retaliation statute. See discussion infra Parts II.B
& V. To the extent this contractual solution is less ideal than a broader federal
whistleblower statute, the contractual approach can be criticized as potentially
undermining efforts to pass comprehensive whistleblower protection. While space
constraints do not permit me to fully address this criticism here, a partial answer
is that we should follow Voltaire's advice and not 'qet the perfect be the enemy of
the good." See Voltaire, La Begueule, in 3 RECUEIL DES MEILLEURS CONTES EN
VERS 77, 77 (1778) ("Le mieux est ennemi du bien."). A comprehensive statutory
solution does not appear likely to pass in the near future. Furthermore, the information that results from this modest contractual approach might actually help
the passage of further reform if it turns out that new contractual rights do not
lead to a significant increase in "frivolous" employee filings, the immediate concern of those who resist more comprehensive statutory whistleblower protections.
Moreover, information about the types of claims brought by whistleblowers under
the contractual approach can help focus any future legislation and fix problems in
the statutory structures of current anti-retaliation provisions. See Ian Ayres &
Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Privatizing Employment Protections, 49 ARIZ. L. REV.
587, 587 (2007) ("[P]rivate imitation of potential public protection not only enhances the remedial benefits afforded by the private commitments in the short
term, it also allows the private efforts to demonstrate what might happen in the
longer term, when public protections are enacted."). And, as Ian Ayres and Jennifer Gerarda Brown noted in a similar context, "[wihen push comes to shove, it is
difficult to turn down the immediate 'bird in the hand' benefits of incremental
progress." Ian Ayres & Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Mark(et)ing Nondiscrimination:
PrivatizingENDA With a Certification Mark, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1639, 1688-90
(2006) [hereinafter Ayres & Brown, ENDA] (responding to similar criticism of
their contractual solution to sexual orientation discrimination).
14. Arnow-Richman, supra note 1, at 1 (introducing symposium related to
contract law and the employment relationship); see also Ayres & Brown, ENDA,
supra note 13, at 1641 (suggesting that corporations should license a certification
mark that would provide employees a cause of action as third-party beneficiaries
of the license agreement for discrimination based on sexual orientation); Cynthia
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interest, to provide broader protection than required by regulatory standards in order to better monitor their own internal
compliance, to convince shareholders that they take compliance
seriously, to curry favor with government regulators, or to effect some combination of these motivations. 15 Ultimately, this
Article suggests that courts and regulators take steps to increase whistleblowers' ability to enforce the promises corporations voluntarily make.
I.

CURRENT APPROACHES TO WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION

Encouraging employees to disclose their inside knowledge
of wrongdoing is a critical step in discovering fraud and other
corporate misconduct. 16 Yet, almost all the benefits of whistleblower disclosures go to people other than the whistleblower,
17
while most of the costs fall on the individual whistleblower.
Society as a whole benefits from increased safety, better health,
Estlund, Something Old, Something New: Governing the Workplace by Contract
Again, 28 COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 351, 374 (2007) (suggesting a broader perspective on using contract law to protect workers' rights); Estlund, supra note 1, at
380-82 (examining two employment law doctrines that contain a blend of contract
law and public law); W. David Slawson, UnilateralContracts of Employment: Does
Contract Law Conflict with Public Policy?, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 9, 24-25
(2003).
15. For a good discussion of why corporations might voluntarily take on potentially more liability than is otherwise required, see Ayres & Brown, EDNA, supra note 13, at 1669-87.
16. Employees often have an inside view of corporate misconduct. For example, a 2007 study found that fifty-six percent of employees reported that they had
observed conduct that "violated company ethics standards, policy, or the law" in
the previous twelve months. See ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, NATIONAL BUSINESS
ETHICS SURVEY 1 (2007), available at http://www.ethics.org/research/nbes.asp.
Employees who report these observations of misconduct serve an important monitoring function. A recent report found that tips uncovered more corporate fraud
than any other source (such as government or internal investigations), and that
employees provided almost two-thirds of those tips. See ASSOC. CERTIFIED FRAUD
EXAMINERS, 2006 ACFE REPORT TO THE NATION ON OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD &
ABUSE 28-29 (2006), available at http://www.acfe.com/documents/2006-rttn.pdf.
For a more complete discussion of the importance of employees as corporate monitors, see Moberly, supra note 7, at 1116-25.
17. See Detlev Nitsch et al.,Why Code of Conduct Violations Go Unreported:A
Conceptual Framework to Guide Intervention and Future Research, 57 J. BUS.
ETHICS 327, 335 (2005) ("The incremental harm done to other stakeholders by ignoring a code violation is judged to be very small and diffuse, while the potential
for harm to oneself, arising from reporting, is much clearer, more immediate, and
painful."); Hearing on Private Sector Whistleblowers: Are There Sufficient Legal
Protections? Before the House Subcomm. on Workforce Protections, Comm. on
Educ. & Lab., 110th Cong. 1-2 (May 15, 2007) (statement of Richard Moberly,
Asst. Prof. of Law, Univ. of Neb. College of Law) [hereinafter 'Moberly Statement"], availableat http://Iaw.unl.edu/people/resident#LAW-rmoberly2.
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and more efficient law enforcement; shareholders benefit from
increased transparency of corporate finances; and employees as
a group benefit from improved working conditions. Whistleblowers, on the other hand, face significant retaliation, from
isolation at work, to discharge, to physical violence. 18 The traditional view, then, has been that in order for society to gain
the benefits of whistleblowing, the law must provide whistleblowers extra-contractual protection from retaliation to reduce
the costs they must endure. 19 In addition to encouraging employees to come forward, anti-retaliation protections can remedy any retaliation that occurs and deter employers from retaliating in the first place.
Anti-retaliation protection for private-sector whistleblowers currently consists of a combination of federal and state
statutory protections, as well as state common law protections
under the tort of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 2 0 This Part briefly discusses each of these types of protections. As described in more detail below, despite the large
number of whistleblower laws, each individual law often covers
only a limited type of whistleblowing activity engaged in by a
narrowly defined group of employees. Thus, even when considered together, anti-retaliation laws offer inconsistent relief to
whistleblowers because of the wide variance in the scope of pro21
tections each provides.
A. FederalStatutory Protection
Over thirty distinct federal statutes provide antiretaliation protection for private-sector employees who engage
in protected activities in a variety of areas, including workplace
18. See Alexander Dyck et al., Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud?
30-31 (NBER Working Paper No. 3, 2007, available at http://www.nber.org
2 88 2
(reporting that employees reported retaliation in eighty-two perpapers/w1
cent of cases in a study of employee whistleblowers); Moberly, supra note 7, at
1130-31.
19. See generally Schwab, supra note 2. Employees consistently list "fear of
retaliation" as a significant factor in why they do not report misconduct they witness. See ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 16, at 6 (reporting results from
2007 survey finding that thirty-six percent of employees did not report misconduct
they witnessed because they feared retaliation). It should be noted, however, that
the most-cited reason employees provide for failing to report misconduct is a concern that nothing will be done to fix the problem. Id.
20. See, e.g., Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State
of State Whistle-blower Protection, 38 AM. Bus. L.J. 99, 100-13 (2000).
21. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 19 (2002) (noting that corporate whistleblowers
were "subject to the patchwork and vagaries of current state laws").
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safety, the environment, and public health. 22 Statutes protect
employees who disclose specific violations in certain safetysensitive industries, such as mining, 23 nuclear energy, 24 and
airlines. 2 5 Private-sector employees also may be protected if
they disclose corporate fraud on the government 26 or on shareholders. 27 The list of protected employees includes some surprises, such as employees who participate in a proceeding regarding drinking water or who report an unsafe international
shipping container. 2 8 In addition to protections directed specifically to whistleblowers in certain industries, many federal
statutes aimed at other issues also include anti-retaliation protections for employees involved in enforcement of those statutes, such as civil rights legislation or laws related to fraud on
29
the government.
Although federal anti-retaliation protections collectively
cover a broad range of industries, each of the individual statutes applies only to a specific type of employee who blows the
whistle about a specific topic. This statutory framework results in a network of narrow protections that evolved on an ad
hoc basis to support specific statutory schemes. Whether federal law protects a whistleblower "depends upon the employer
for whom the employee works, the industry in which the employee works, the type of misconduct reported, the way in
which the employee blew the whistle, and, under some statutes, the willingness of administrative agencies to enforce the
law." 30 For example, the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act
protects only miners who make disclosures related specifically
to safety in mines. 3 1 Thus, federal whistleblower protection

22. See WESTMAN & MODESITr, supra note 11, at 319-20 (listing statutes).
23. See Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2000).
24. See Energy Reorganization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000).
25. See Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st
Century (AIR 21), 49 U.S.C. § 42121 (2000).
26. See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000).
27. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).
28. See Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9 (2000); International Safe
Container Act, 46 U.S.C. § 80507 (2000).
29. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 189-202 (citing antiretaliation protections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3(a) (2000), and the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2000), as examples).
30. Moberly Statement, supra note 17, at 4; see also Moberly, supra note 7, at
1129-30.
31. See Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. § 815(c) (2000).
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takes what I previously called a "rifle-shot" approach because
32
of each statute's narrow application.
B. State Statutory Protection
State statutes provide inconsistent whistleblower protection as well. While most states statutorily protect public-sector
workers who disclose government illegality and waste, 33 only
seventeen state statutes protect private-sector whistleblowers. 34 Because of the moderate number of states that have enacted such protections, state statutes may protect employees
across the country differently, depending on location, even
where the employees work for the same company.
State protection for whistleblowers can be considered the
converse of federal protection. State statutes tend to have
broader coverage with regard to the type of whistleblowing
considered a "protected activity," but because the statutes apply only to employees in a single state, these anti-retaliation
provisions protect a smaller number of employees than many
federal statutes. For example, Connecticut's whistleblower
statute protects employees who report a broad range of misconduct, including a violation of any state or federal law, regulation, or municipal ordinance or regulation, unethical practices, mismanagement, or abuse of authority. 35 This broad
36
protection, of course, applies only to workers in Connecticut.
Thus, while state anti-retaliation statutes may provide
broader protections than federal laws, the variability among
states means that state statutes arguably have less impact.
C. Tort Protections
At least forty jurisdictions permit a whistleblower to bring
a tort claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy
against an employer. 37 Such broad coverage, however, suffers
from the same interstate variability as state statutory protec32. Moberly Statement, supra note 17, at 2.
33. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 67.
34. See id. at 77. This number does not include states that may include antiretaliation protection in a fair employment statute similar to Title VII, in which
an employee is protected when opposing discrimination or participating in a process related to a discrimination claim. See id. at 78.
35. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51m (2007).
36. See id.
37. WESTMAN & MODESITr, supra note 11, at 95.
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tion. 38 For example, jurisdictions vary on the permissible
source of public policy that a whistleblower must claim has
been violated by the employer's retaliation. 3 9 Some courts require the whistleblower to articulate a public policy based in
constitutional, statutory, or common law grounds, while other
courts permit a broader inquiry into public policy reflected in
administrative regulations and even professional codes of ethics. 40 Further, courts differ on the extent to which they permit
federal statutes or regulations to serve as the basis for state
public policy. 4 1 Some courts consistently permit a wrongful
discharge claim for whistleblowers who report violations of federal law. 4 2 Others take a much more circumspect approach, either by requiring the federal law to reflect state public policy 43
or by refusing to look to federal law as a source of public policy.

44

State tort law also protects internal and external whistleblowers inconsistently. Some jurisdictions protect whistleblowers who report misconduct to a supervisor or another person inside the company, 4 5 while other states' common law
protects only external whistleblowers, under the rationale that
reporting misconduct internally does not sufficiently advance
the public interest. 46 Even more narrowly, one Missouri court
38. Id. at 131 ("Because the common law continues to evolve ... there is currently no consensus among the jurisdictions in the United States regarding the
circumstances under which active whistleblowers should or should not be protected by the law.").
39. See Nancy Modesitt, Wrongful Discharge: The Use of Federal Law as a
Source of Public Policy, 8 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 623, 625-26 (2006) (citing
cases).
40. See id.
41. See id. at 627-32 (discussing three varied approaches taken by state
courts when examining wrongful discharge claims in which federal law is the
source of the alleged public policy).
42. See, e.g., Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1090 (Wash.
1984) (relying on federal law as a "clear expression of public policy").
43. See, e.g., Peterson v. Browning, 832 P.2d 1280, 1283 (Utah 1992) (refusing
to adopt automatically all of federal law as a source of public policy).
44. See, e.g., Oakley v. May Dep't Stores Co., 17 F. Supp. 2d 533, 536 (E.D.
Va. 1998) (stating that Virginia does not appear to recognize federal law as a basis for public policy claims); Shrout v. TFE Group, 161 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2005) (refusing to examine public policy claim based on federal regulation).
45. See, e.g., WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 143 n.253-54.
46. See id. at 143 ("The jurisdictions are split on whether internal whistleblowing within the employer's organization is protected, as contrasted with external whistleblowing to appropriate government officials."); Schwab, supra note 2,
at 1966; see, e.g., Zumot v. Data Mgmt. Co., No. 2002-CA-002454, 2004 WL
405888, at *2 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 5, 2004); Wholey v. Sears Roebuck, 803 A.2d 482,
492-93 (Md. 2002).
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found that the public policy tort did not apply to an employee
who reported suspicions about a manager's violation of criminal laws because the employee reported the violation to that
manager only, and not to an appropriate internal or external
authority.

47

Moreover, some jurisdictions make equally nuanced distinctions in other areas. Massachusetts, for example, protects
whistleblowers who report suspected criminal activity 4 8 but not
whistleblowers who complain about unfair and deceptive trade
practices. 49 The Fifth Circuit has held that Mississippi's
wrongful discharge tort applies only to whistleblowers who report criminal violations, not civil misconduct.5 0 Other states do
not protect whistleblowers who disclose violations of internal
financial or business practices. 5 1 Some states protect employees who refuse to engage in illegal activity but not employees
who actively report their employer's illegal activity. 52 These
distinctions mean that whistleblowers often must know discrete and nuanced details about common law protection for the
law to actually encourage whistleblowing. 53 Thus, as Professor
Cynthia Estlund notes, the tort of wrongful discharge provides

47. See Faust v. Ryder Commercial Leasing & Servs., 954 S.W.2d 383, 391
(Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
48. See Shea v. Emmanuel Coll., 682 N.E.2d 1348, 1350 (Mass. 1997).
49. See Mistishen v. Falcone Piano Co., 630 N.E.2d 294, 296 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994).
50. See, e.g., Wheeler v. BL Dev. Corp., 415 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2005);
Howell v. Operations Mgmt. Intern'l, Inc., 77 Fed. App'x. 248, 251 (5th Cir. 2003).
51. See, e.g., Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 400-01 (Del. 2000); Hayes v. Eateries, Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 788 (Okla. 1995); see also Moberly, supra note 7, at 1162
n.272.
52. For example, Indiana courts have permitted an employee who was fired
for refusing to drive a truck that exceeded the state's weight limit to bring a
wrongful discharge claim. See McClanahan v. Remington Freight Lines, Inc., 517
N.E.2d 390, 390 (Ind. 1988). However, they have not allowed a claim by a whisSee
tleblower who reported safety problems with pharmaceutical products.
Campbell v. Eli Lilly & Co., 413 N.E.2d 1054, 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). Texas
also strictly limits claims to "passive" whistleblowers who refuse to engage in illegal activity; Texas courts do not protect "active" whistleblowers who report their
employer's misconduct. See, e.g., Austin v. HealthTrust, Inc.-The Hosp. Co., 967
S.W.2d 400, 401 (Tex. 1998); Laredo Med. Group Corp. v. Mireles, 155 S.W.3d
417, 421 (Tex. App. 2004); Mayfield v. Lockheed Eng'g & Scis. Co., 970 S.W.2d
185, 187 (Tex. App. 1998).
53. One commentator aptly summarized state law protection for whistleblowers by stating that, "state whistleblower law is murky, piecemeal, disorganized,
and varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction." Miriam A. Cherry, Whistling in the
Dark? Corporate Fraud, Whistleblowers, and the Implications of the SarbanesOxley Act for Employment Law, 79 WASH. L. REV. 1029, 1049 (2004).
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inadequate security to employees and leaves in place "powerful
'54
incentives for employee compliance and silence.
D. Loopholes and Barriers
The complex combination of federal and state statutory
protection and the tort of wrongful discharge provide inconsistent anti-retaliation protection that depends substantially on
whether the whistleblower is the "right" type of employee who
works for the "right" type of employer in the "right" type of industry. Protection also depends upon whether the employee
reported the "right" type of misconduct in the "right" way. As
interpreted by one commentator, despite the abundant laws
protecting whistleblowers, "most legal protection for whistleblowers is illusory; few whistleblowers are protected from retaliatory actions because of numerous loopholes and special
'55
conditions of these laws.
These loopholes and conditions become significant procedural and substantive barriers for whistleblowers. 56 For example, a recent study of retaliation claims under the SarbanesOxley Act, 57 purportedly one of the most protective antiretaliation statutes in the country, found that whistleblowers
frequently lost because they could not fit their claims into the
legal boundaries of the Act. 58 Specifically, whistleblowers often
lost their claims because they either worked for the wrong type
of employer (Sarbanes-Oxley covers only employees of publiclytraded companies) or made the wrong type of disclosure (the
Act protects only disclosures related to certain types of fraud). 59
54. See Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will
World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996).
55. TERANCE MIETHE, WHISTLEBLOWING AT WORK: TOUGH CHOICES IN
EXPOSING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE ON THE JOB 147-48 (1999); see also Mary

Kreiner Ramirez, Blowing the Whistle on Whistleblower Protection:A Tale of Reform Versus Power, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 183, 191 (2007). Miethe also adds that
whistleblowers have a significant disadvantage in litigation as individual plaintiffs against corporate defendants with substantially more resources.
See
MIETHE, supra,at 147-48.
56. Cf. Richard Michael Fischl, Rethinking the Tripartite Division of American Work Law, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 163, 181-82 (2007) (describing the
danger of legal boundaries when an employee attempts "to squeeze their 'square
peg' of a case into the 'round hole' of the applicable legal category").
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004).
58. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 91-120 (finding that Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblowers won only 3.6% of claims after an administrative agency investigation
and only 6.5% of cases before an administrative law judge).
59. See id. at 109-20.
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In addition, whistleblowers lost because they were found not to
have an objectively "reasonable belief' that misconduct occurred, even if they had a good faith belief that wrongdoing
happened. 60 The study demonstrated that administrative decision makers often narrowly interpreted the Act's legal bounda61
ries as well.
Thus, one prominent sociologist concludes that "[w]histleblowers think this means that caprice rules. It is hard to say
they are wrong." 62 As a result, statutes and tort laws often do
not protect whistleblowers. Additionally, such variability in
the law undermines the other goals of encouraging whistleblowers and deterring corporate misconduct. Whistleblowers
have little ability to predict whether the law will protect them
if they disclose misconduct. The unpredictability of these nuanced requirements can only result in fewer whistleblower disclosures. 63 In fact, a 2007 study found that, even after the passage of purportedly strong whistleblower protection in the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,64 employees played a smaller role in reporting misconduct compared to other monitors, such as the
government or outside accountants, than before the Act's passage. 65 Another study recently found that forty-two percent of
employees who observe misconduct at work do not report it,
which is comparable to the pre-Sarbanes-Oxley figure of fortyfour percent in 2000.66 If statutory and tort anti-retaliation
provisions do not protect employees, employees will be unwilling to report corporate malfeasance, and corporations may not
be deterred from engaging in conduct harmful to society. In
short, despite the best intentions of these anti-retaliation protections, taken collectively their narrow and nuanced approach
undermines their commendable goals.

60. See id. at 102 tbl.4. Sarbanes-Oxley will only protect a whistleblower who
has a "reasonable belief' that a statutory violation occurred. See 18 U.S.C. §
1514A(a)(1).
61. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 128-31.
62. C. FRED ALFORD, WHISTLEBLOWERS: BROKEN LIVES AND ORGANIZATIONAL
POWER 112 (2001).
63. See Martin H. Malin, Protecting the Whistleblower from Retaliatory Discharge, 16 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 277, 286 (1983) ("[A]ny standard of whistleblower protection must offer the employee a considerable measure of predictability.").
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A.
65. See Dyck, supra note 18, at 35-36.
66. See ETHICS RESOURCE CENTER, supra note 16, at 3.
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CONTRACT PROTECTION FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

Even with these failings, tort and statutory remedies
dominate the discussion of anti-retaliation protections for whistleblowers. However, because this piecemeal system protects
only certain whistleblowers under precisely-defined conditions,
another option for protecting whistleblowers is worth exploring. Whistleblowers who suffer retaliation by their employers
should be able to bring breach of contract claims to enforce the
anti-retaliation promises made by companies in their Codes.
This Part briefly explains why corporations make antiretaliation promises and discusses the potential benefits of permitting whistleblowers to enforce these promises contractually.
First, if enforceable, these Code promises often would provide
broader protection to more employees than almost any other
current statutory or tort law protection. 67 Second, enforcing
Code promises may level the procedural playing field between
whistleblowers and employers by providing a longer statute of
limitations period than statutory protections and by permitting
whistleblowers to avoid burdensome administrative procedures. 68 Third, providing contractual protection to whistleblowers should increase the effectiveness of the broader move69
ment to encourage corporate self-regulation.
A.

The IncreasingPrevalenceof Anti-retaliationPromises

Three main phenomena contributed to the current prevalence of corporate anti-retaliation promises: a dramatic increase in corporations voluntarily publishing Codes; the government's use of incentives that encourage corporations to
implement internal monitoring systems; and the recent requirement that publicly-traded companies issue formal
70
Codes.
1.

Voluntary Efforts

Beginning in the 1970s, corporations voluntarily issued
Codes in response to various corporate scandals publicized at

67.
68.
69.
70.

See discussion infra Part II.B.
See discussion infra Part II.C.
See discussion infra Part II.D.
See infra text accompanying notes 71-105.
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the time. 7 1 For example, after corporations were accused of
bribing foreign government officials in the 1970s, companies released Codes that made it corporate "policy" not to engage in
corrupt practices. 72 Similarly, after several government contractors were found to have engaged in government fraud and
over-billing in the defense industry in the mid-1980s, dozens of
contractors voluntarily agreed to adopt an industry-wide code
of conduct to encourage compliance with government procurement laws. 73 Also, after the insider trading scandals during
the same time period, companies added anti-insider trading
74
policies to their Codes.
Companies published these Codes for several reasons: corporations attempted to convince shareholders and regulators
that they were taking reasonable steps to ensure that their
employees did not engage in illegality; Codes instructed employees as to the bounds of permissible employment activity;
and companies hoped that the Code would reduce or even
eliminate liability for actions taken by employees in violation of
company policy. 75 Although scholars question the Codes' effectiveness at actually reducing corporate crime, 76 most corporations voluntarily published some sort of Code that described
71. See Wesley Cragg, Ethics, Globalization and the Phenomenon of SelfRegulation: An Introduction, in ETHICS CODES, CORPORATIONS AND THE
CHALLENGE OF GLOBALIZATION 1, 10-11 (Wesley Cragg, ed. 2005); Harvey L. Pitt
& Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate Civil and Criminal Liability: A
Second Look at Corporate Codes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1585-86 (1990);
Glen R. Sanderson & Iris I. Varner, What's Wrong with CorporateCodes of Conduct?, 66 MGMT. ACCT. 28, 28 (1984).
72. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1582.
73. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failureof Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 497 (2003).
74. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1599 (noting that the insider
trading scandals of the 1980s "reinforced the conclusion that corporate codes
should be part of the repertoire of corporate self-governance"); see also Marisa
Anne Pagnattaro & Ellen R. Peirce, Between a Rock and a Hard Place: The Conflict Between U.S. Corporate Codes of Conduct and European Privacy and Work
Laws, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 375, 383 (2007).
75. See RONALD E. BERENBEIM, CORPORATE ETHICS 13-14 (1987); Robert
Jackall, Whistleblowing & Its Quandaries, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1133, 1134
(2007); Katherine E. Kenny, Comment, Code or Contract: Whether Wal-Mart's
Code of Conduct Creates a Contractual ObligationBetween Wal-Mart and the Employees of its Foreign Suppliers, 27 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 453, 457 (2007); Pagnattaro & Peirce, supra note 74, at 383-84.
76. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 73, at 510-12. But see David Hess, A Business Ethics Perspective on Sarbanes-Oxley and the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1781, 1791-95 (2007) (reviewing empirical studies
of compliance programs and concluding that a properly implemented program can
reduce fraud and increase whistleblowing).
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the formal corporate policy on a number of potential illegalities,
such as antitrust violations, insider trading, and corporate
fraud. 77 During this period, various groups recommended several "model" Codes of Ethics that included anti-retaliation protection for whistleblowers. 7 8 However, Codes actually implemented by corporations rarely mentioned such whistleblower
79
protection.
2.

Government Incentives

In the 1990s, however, the content of Codes began to
change when the federal government, as well as various judicial decisions, provided corporations significant incentives to
implement internal compliance systems to detect illegality
within the corporation.8 0 These compliance systems evolved to
include at least three parts: (1) communication of compliance
rules to employees; (2) a means for employees to report viola77. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1601-03.
78. See PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT,
A QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE: FINAL REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 251 (1986) (listing
as one of the guiding principles of the Defense Industry Initiatives on Business
Ethics and Conduct that "[e]ach company will create a free and open atmosphere
that allows and encourages employees to report violations of its code to the company without fear of retribution for such reporting"), available at http://
www.ndu.edu/library/pbrc/36Ex2AppCl.pdf; see id. at App. N (noting recommendation of Ethics Resource Center survey that whistleblower protection should be
included in a code of ethics); TREADWAY COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 35-36 (1987), available at
http://www.coso.org/Publications/NCFFR.pdf ("The code of corporate conduct
should protect employees who use these internal procedures against reprisal.
Failure to adopt guarantees against reprisal as well as to provide an effective internal complaint procedure could undermine the vitality of codes of conduct ..
. ."1).

79. See BERENBEIM, supra note 75, at 1-18 (broad survey of 227 corporate
codes of ethics without mention of anti-retaliation protections); FOUNDATION OF
THE SOUTHWESTERN GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BANKING, A STUDY OF CORPORATE
ETHICAL POLICY STATEMENTS 24-25 (1980) (survey of ethical policies of 174 U.S.
corporations without mention of anti-retaliation protections); PRESIDENT'S BLUE
RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, supra note 78, at 265 (reproducing 1986 survey of ninety-one defense contractors which found that twenty-one
percent of the contractors' codes of ethics included whistleblower protection); Center for Business Ethics, Are Corporations Institutionalizing Ethics, 5 J. BUS.
ETHICS 85, 85-91 (1986) (survey of 279 Fortune 500 companies' views on ethics
without mentioning anti-retaliation provisions); Donald R. Cressey & Charles A.
Moore, ManagerialValues and CorporateCodes of Ethics, 25 CAL. MGMT. REV. 53,
53-77 (1983) (analysis of 119 corporate conduct codes from mid-1970s without
discussion of anti-retaliation provisions); Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at
1601-03 (summarizing contents of many Codes); Sanderson & Varner, supra note
71, at 31.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 82-99.

20081

PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS BY CONTRACT

991

tions of those rules; and (3) anti-retaliation protections for
those whistleblowing employees.
First, in 1991, the federal government released its Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, which provided massive
criminal penalty reductions for a corporation that implemented
an "effective" compliance system. 8 1 Piggy-backing on the voluntary corporate efforts of the previous two decades, the commentary to the 1991 version of the Guidelines suggested that
an effective compliance system should include a method for an
organization to communicate its ethical regulations to its management and employees. 82 In 2004, this commentary was formally moved into the Guidelines' requirements. 83 Part of the
accepted practice for corporations to comply with this "communication" element of the Guidelines was to release a corporate
84
Code.
Second, incentive programs went beyond the initial voluntary efforts of the 1970s and 1980s that merely recited corporate rules and policies. The incentive programs also explicitly
required corporate compliance systems to implement a way for
employees to report misconduct to the company. For example,
under the current Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, organizations must have and publicize a system for employees to
"report or seek guidance regarding potential or actual criminal
conduct. '8 5 Similarly, courts released judicial decisions explicitly providing benefits to corporations that implemented a
channel for employees to report misconduct.8 6 In 1996, the
Delaware Chancery Court issued an influential decision finding
that a corporate director could avoid a claim of breach of fiduciary duty of care if the director had implemented an adequate
"corporate information and reporting system."8 7 Two years
81. See Krawiec, supra note 73, at 498-99; Pagnattaro & Peirce, supra note
74, at 384.
82. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2, Application Note 3(k)(5)

(1991).
83. See Amendment 673 from the Supplement to Appendix C, Guidelines
Manual (Nov. 1, 2004), available at http://www.ussc.gov/orgguide.htm (last visited
Aug. 24, 2008).
84. See Krawiec, supra note 73, at 495-96.
85.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(4)(A) (2004), available

at http://www.ussc.gov/guidelin.htm.
86. See Elletta Sangrey Callahan et al., Integrating Trends in Whistleblowing
and Corporate Governance: Promoting OrganizationalEffectiveness, Societal Responsibility, and Employee Empowerment, 40 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 190-93 (2002).
87. See In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996); see also
Terry Morehead Dworkin, Whistleblowing, MNC's, and Peace, 35 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 466 (2002); Moberly, supra note 7, at 1135.
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later, in the twin cases Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth8 8 and
Faragherv. City of Boca Raton,89 the U.S. Supreme Court provided an affirmative defense to an employer in a sexual harassment case if the employer had, among other things, an antiharassment policy and an internal grievance procedure. 9 0
Third, many of the incentive programs strongly suggested
that an important part of any effective internal compliance system must be a corporate promise not to retaliate against any
employee who discloses corporate misconduct. The Organizational Sentencing Guidelines explicitly require that corporations must offer a whistleblower disclosure channel that employees can utilize "without fear of retaliation." 9 1 Similarly,
the EEOC advises that an anti-harassment policy and complaint procedure will not be effective unless the employer
"make[s] clear that it will not tolerate adverse treatment of
employees because they report harassment or provide information related to such complaints. ' '92 Indeed, courts conclude
that, absent evidence to the contrary, an anti-harassment policy can presumptively satisfy the Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative
defense discussed above if the policy provides a "clear direction
as to how to report sexual harassment and ...includ[es] a con-

fidentiality and anti-retaliation provision. '93 Conversely, several courts have found that the lack of a promise not to retaliate in an anti-harassment policy can contribute to a court
finding that the employer failed to satisfy the Faragher/Ellerth
94
affirmative defense.
88. 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998).
89. 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
90. An employer can utilize the affirmative defense if it made reasonable efforts to deter and correct illegally harassing behavior, which according to the
Court includes having an anti-harassment policy and an internal grievance procedure. See Burlington Indus., Inc., 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher,524 U.S. at 807; see
also Moberly, supra note 7, at 1135.
91. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §8B2.1(b)(5)(C) (2004).
92. See U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, ENFORCEMENT
GUIDANCE: VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR UNLAWFUL HARASSMENT

BY SUPERVISORS (June 18, 1999), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs
harassment.html#VC.
93. Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir.
2001). See also Montero v. AGCO Corp., 192 F.3d 856, 861-862 (9th Cir. 1999)
(finding the anti-harassment policy at issue to be effective because it contained,
among other things, an anti-retaliation provision); Reed v. Cedar County, 474 F.
Supp. 2d 1045, 1063 (N.D. Iowa 2007) (same); Garone v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
436 F. Supp. 2d 448, 472 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (same). See generally Elinor P. Schroeder, Handbooks, Disclaimers, and Harassment Policies: Another Look at Clark
County School District v. Breeden, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 581, 588 (2004).

94.

See Williams v. Spartan Commc'ns, Inc., No. 99-1566, 2000 WL 331605, at

2008]

PROTECTING WHISTLEBLOWERS BY CONTRACT

993

Ultimately, corporate Codes combined these three aspects
95
of incentive programs into a single corporate policy document.
"Best practices" for internal control systems included implementing a viable and comprehensive whistleblower policy that
encouraged employees to report misconduct and that included a
promise not to retaliate against them. 9 6 Thus, the issuance of a
Code evolved from a voluntary recitation of corporate rules and
policies to an embodiment of an affirmative corporate structure
designed to allow whistleblowers to disclose evidence of misconduct within the corporation. An important part of this new
structure included an explicit promise not to retaliate against
employees who utilized these whistleblower disclosure chan97
nels.
*3 (4th Cir. Mar. 30, 2000) (finding that the employer failed to state an affirmative defense because, among other things, the employer "disseminated an antiharassment policy which failed to provide that complainants would be free from
retaliation, and yet warned that false reports of harassment would subject a complainant to disciplinary action, 'including termination"'); Thomas v. BET Soundstage Restaurant, 104 F. Supp. 2d 558, 566 (D. Md. 2000) (noting that the employer's policy is "silent as to any prohibition against retaliation"); Miller v.
Woodharbor Molding & Millworks, Inc., 80 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1029-30 (N.D. Iowa
2000) (finding that a policy without an anti-retaliation provision was "woefully
inadequate").
95. See Joshua A. Newberg, CorporateCodes of Ethics, Mandatory Disclosure,
and the Market for Ethical Conduct, 29 VT. L. REV. 253, 262-64 (2005).
96. See, e.g., Tim V. Eaton & Michael D. Akers, Whistleblowing and Good
Governance: Policies for Universities, Government Entities, and Nonprofit Organizations, 77 CPA JOURNAL 66, 70 (2007) (listing current best practices for nonprofit organizations to develop a whistleblower policy); Pagnattaro & Peirce, supra note 74, at 397-99 (citing to Deloitte and Corporate Board Member magazine
study finding that ninety percent of surveyed companies implemented anonymous
whistleblower reporting system). Scholars and other organizational experts recognized that whistleblowing policies must include a non-retaliation provision in
order to be effective. See, e.g., Tim Barnett et al., The Internal DisclosurePolicies
of Private-Sector Employers: An Initial Look at Their Relationship to Employee
Whistleblowing, 12 J. BUS. ETHICS 127, 129 (1993); Eaton & Akers, supra, at 70
(discussing necessity of non-retaliation provision for non-profit organizations);
Harold Hassink et al., A Content Analysis of Whistleblowing Policies of Leading
European Companies, 75 J. Bus. ETHICS 25, 38 (2007); Mark S. Schwartz, A Code
of Ethics for Corporate Code of Ethics, 41 J. BUS. ETHICS 27, 35, 39 (2002); Steven
Weller, The Effectiveness of Corporate Codes of Ethics, 7 J. BUS. ETHICS 389, 394
(1988); TREADWAY COMM'N, supra note 78, at 35-36 ("The code of corporate conduct should protect employees who use these internal procedures against reprisal.
Failure to adopt guarantees against reprisal as well as to provide an effective internal complaint procedure could undermine the vitality of codes of conduct- .. ").
97. See, e.g., Barnett et al., supra note 96, at 131 (noting that results from a
1993 survey of human resource professionals indicated that about two-thirds of
companies with internal disclosure policies promised protection from retaliation
for employee whistleblowers); Pagnattaro & Peirce, supra note 74, at 398 ("Whistleblowing thus became a staple provision in corporate codes of conduct after
these changes.").
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Mandated Codes

The third, and most recent, phenomenon transformed
these previous voluntary and incentive-based programs into a
requirement that corporations publish Codes that include antiretaliation promises for whistleblowers. After Enron's bankruptcy in February 2002, the Security and Exchange Commission ("SEC") requested that the stock exchanges examine their
listing standards related to corporate governance. 98 In response, the exchanges issued new corporate governance standards for companies to satisfy in order to list corporate shares
on their exchanges. 99
The listing rules require corporations to promise broad
whistleblower protection.
First, the two major stock exchanges, NYSE and NASDAQ, require their listing issuers to
adopt a Code that applies to all employees.10 0 Second, the Code
must provide for an enforcement mechanism to encourage
prompt, internal reporting of violations of the Code. 0 1 The
NYSE and NASDAQ listing requirements specifically mandate
that the Code include corporate assurances that it will not retaliate against an employee for reporting violations of the
Code.10 2 The NYSE also requires that companies protect em98. See Securities and Exchange Commission, NASD and NYSE Rulemaking:
Relating to Corporate Governance, Release No. 34-48745 (Nov. 4, 2003) (citing
Commission Press Release No. 2002-23 (February 13, 2002)).
99. The stock exchanges actually proposed new listing standards to the SEC,
which subsequently approved them. See Securities and Exchange Commission,
NASD and NYSE Rulemaking: Relating to CorporateGovernance, Release No. 3448745 (Nov. 4, 2003) (approving NYSE and NASD listing standards); Securities
and Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations;Order Granting Approval of ProposedRule Change by the American Stock Exchange LLC and Notice
of Filing and Order GrantingAccelerated Approval of Amendment No. 2 Relating
To Enhanced Corporate Governance Requirements Applicable to Listed Companies, Release No. 34-48863 (Dec. 1, 2003) (approving American Stock Exchange
(AmEx) standards); Securities And Exchange Commission, Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Filing and Order Granting Accelerated Approval of Proposed Rule Change by the Boston Stock Exchange, Inc. to Amend Chapter XXVII,
Section 10 of the Rules of the Board of Governors By Adding Requirements Concerning Corporate Governance Standardsof Exchange-Listed Companies, Release
No. 34-49955 (July 1, 2004) (approving Boston Stock Exchange listing standards).
100. See NYSE LISTING MANUAL § 303A.10 ("Listed companies must adopt and
disclose a code of business conduct and ethics for directors, officers and employees ..... "); NASDAQ MANUAL ONLINE § 4350(n), available at http:llwallstreet.cch.com/nasdaq/.
101. See NYSE LISTING MANUAL § 303A.10; NASDAQ MANUAL ONLINE §
4350(n).
102. See NYSE LISTING MANUAL § 303A.10; NASDAQ INTERPRETATIVE
MANUAL ONLINE § IM-4350-7. The AmEx does not contain an explicit require-
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ployees who make reports in "good faith,"10 3 while the
NASDAQ requires protection of those reporting "questionable
behavior."1 04 Third, the exchanges require that corporations
publicize their Code; the NYSE goes further and specifically
mandates that companies place their Code on their corporate
websites 10 5 In short, general policies about whistleblowing are
not enough; these corporate governance standards require
10 6
promises not to retaliate.
B. Substantive Benefits: BroaderProtections
If courts take the anti-retaliation promises contained in
corporate Codes seriously, the Codes could provide broader
whistleblower protection than traditional tort and statutory
anti-retaliation remedies. For example, Wal-Mart, the world's
largest private employer, 10 7 issued a Statement of Ethics in
2005 stating that all employees "are required to report any
known or suspected violations of the law, applicable regula08
tions or this Statement of Ethics or any Wal-Mart policy."'
The Statement also states, in bold print and highlighted by a
ment regarding retaliation. See AMEX COMPANY GUIDE, § 807.
103. See NYSE LISTING MANUAL § 303A.10 ("To encourage employees to report
such violations, the listed company must ensure that employees know that the
company will not allow retaliation for reports made in good faith.").
104. See NASDAQ INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL ONLINE § IM-4350-7 ("Each code
of conduct must also contain an enforcement mechanism that ensures prompt and
consistent enforcement of the code, protection for persons reporting questionable
behavior, clear and objective standards for compliance, and a fair process by
which to determine violations.").
105. See NYSE LISTING MANUAL § 303A.10 ("Each listed company's website
must include its code of business conduct and ethics. The listed company must
state in its annual proxy statement or, if the company does not file an annual
proxy statement, in the company's annual report on Form 10-K filed with the
SEC, that the foregoing information is available on its website and that the information is available in print to any shareholder who requests it."); NASDAQ
MANUAL ONLINE § 4350(n) (requiring that the code be made "publicly available");
AMEX COMPANY GUIDE §807 (same).
106. In the context of attempting to provide contractual protection against sexual orientation discrimination, Ian Ayres and Jennifer Gerarda Brown note the
importance of obtaining contractual promises of nondiscrimination rather than
merely unenforceable nondiscrimination policies. See Ayres & Brown, EDNA, supra note 13, at 1692-93. The new listing standards seem to recognize that important distinction with regard to whistleblowers by demanding assurances that
whistleblowers will not suffer retaliation.
107. See Fortune Global 500 List of Biggest Employers, http://money.cnn.com/
magazines/fortune/global5OO/2007/performers/companies/biggest-employers/
index.html (last visited Aug. 2, 2008).
108. See Wal-Mart Statement of Ethics, at 5 (emphasis in original), available
at http://walmartstores.com/media/Investors/Ethics%20_Current.pdf.
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surrounding box, that no employee "who in good faith reports a
suspected violation will be subject to retaliation for having
made the report."'109
Two recent studies indicate that the Codes at many publicly-traded corporations utilize the same type of language as
Wal-Mart's Code. The first study involved a preliminary examination of thirty Codes from companies randomly selected
from NYSE-listed corporations that filed annual reports with
the SEC in 2007.110 The second study surveyed whistleblower
111
provisions from the largest 100 European-listed companies.
As demonstrated by these two studies and discussed in more
detail in the following sub-sections, Code anti-retaliation promises like Wal-Mart's can fill the important gaps in tort and
statutory protections because they often (1) apply to all the
company's workers; (2) protect a wide range of disclosures; and
(3) require a whistleblower only to have a "good faith" belief in
the accuracy of the disclosure.
1.

Always the Right Employer and Employee

First, unlike many statutory protections, Code provisions
obviously cover the employer that issued the Code and also
typically cover all employees of the corporation.
Statutory protections provide more limited coverage. Federal anti-retaliation statutes often apply only to certain employers. For example, as noted above, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
112
Alapplies only to publicly-traded corporate employers.
though state statutes typically cover all private-sector employees, 1 13 some state statutes cover only employers with a mini109.

110.

See id.

The study eventually will include Codes from companies listed on the
NASDAQ and the AmEx as well, and a full description of the study's methodology
and results will be published elsewhere. See Richard Moberly, Whistleblower
Policiesand Codes of Ethics (forthcoming) (manuscript on file with author).
111. See Hassink et al., supra note 96, at 31. The European study surveyed
companies found on the Ftse Eurotop-100 about their whistleblower policies. The
study's final sample included responding companies from the survey (twenty-five
percent response rate) as well as whistleblower policies located on the websites of
other non-Ftse Europtop-100 companies listed on the Dutch AEX index and SWX
Swiss Exchange. Id. Ultimately, the study examined whistleblower policies for
fifty-six European companies. Id. Although European policies may not be directly relevant to American workers, the study provides data that supplements
my study of NYSE-listed companies regarding current corporate practices related
to whistleblower policies.
112. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
113. See WESTMAN & MODESIrr, supra note 11, at 78-79 (noting that all but a
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mum number of employees. 1 14 Such limitations can have bite
during litigated whistleblower cases. Under Sarbanes-Oxley,
28.9% of the cases decided in favor of employers were resolved
because the employer was not a publicly-traded company cov115
ered by the Act.
Employees not afforded whistleblower protection by a specific statutory provision covering their employer may be able to
use a breach of contract claim to avoid statutory restrictions. In
Brady v. Calyon Securities,1 16 a research analyst for a securities broker-dealer claimed that he was fired in retaliation for
reporting alleged violations of securities laws, rules, and regulations. 117 This type of disclosure typically would fall squarely
within the type of "protected activity" covered by the SarbanesOxley Act. 118 However, the court dismissed the employee's
Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claim because the defendant
corporation was not a publicly-traded company. 119 At the same
time, the court permitted the employee to bring a separate
claim based on the same whistleblowing activity for violation of
the company's Compliance Manual, which encouraged employees to report misconduct and promised not to retaliate against
them if they did. 120 The clear applicability of the Compliance
Manual to the company avoided Sarbanes-Oxley's statutory
distinction between publicly-traded and privately-held corporations.
Moreover, because a corporate Code always applies to the
company and its employees, enforcing a Code promise often
avoids a debate about whether a worker is a "covered em-

few state statutes protect all employees regardless of the size of the employer).
114. See id. at 79 (noting that Florida's anti-retaliation statute covers employers with ten or more employees, see FLA. STAT. § 448.101(3) (2004), and Louisiana's statute covers employers with twenty or more employees within the state
each working day of twenty or more weeks in the current or previous calendar
year, see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:302(2) (2004)).
115. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 109 (examining decisions of administrative
law judges under the Act).
116. 406 F. Supp. 2d 307 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
117. Seeid.at310.
118. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004) (protecting employees who make disclosures about violations of federal securities
laws, among other things).
119. See Brady, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 318.
120. See id. at 316 (quoting the Compliance Manual as saying, "Calyon Americas shall not discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass, or in any manner discriminate against any employee in the terms and conditions of employment based
upon any lawful actions of such employee in response to good faith reporting of
Complaints or participation in a related investigation").
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ployee." Some federal statutes apply only to certain types of
employees. The Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982,
for example, applies only to employees who are drivers of commercial motor vehicles, mechanics, or freight handlers who directly affect commercial motor vehicle safety in the course of
their employment. 12 1 State statutes and tort law protect individual employees within the same multi-state corporation differently depending upon the state in which the employee resides or works. By contrast, a corporate Code that explicitly
applies to all employees would cover a corporation's employees
regardless of job duty or geographic location. For example,
Wal-Mart's Statement of Ethics applies to all employees
worldwide as well as the corporate Board of Directors. 122 In
fact, while independent contractors and some contingent workers may still be excluded from some Codes' coverage, the WalMart Statement even applies to the company's "suppliers, consultants, law firms, public relations firms, contractors, and
other service providers," who are expected to comply with the
123
Statement of Ethics.
Corporate Codes generally mirror Wal-Mart's broad coverage. In the preliminary study mentioned above, one-hundred
percent of the NYSE Codes applied to all employees. 124 Similarly, ninety-six percent of European whistleblower policies
covered all employees of the company. 125 Thus, in many cases,
the anti-retaliation promise contained in a corporate Code can
reduce the chance that a whistleblower will not be protected
because the whistleblower was not a "covered employee" or did
not work for a "covered employer."
2.

Broader Protected Activity

Second, Codes often create a broader scope of protected activity than statutory or tort protection. Federal anti-retaliation
statutes typically protect only disclosures related to certain
topics, such as fraud in the Sarbanes-Oxley context 126 or
worker health and safety under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act. 12 7 As with the "covered employer" determination,
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a).
See Wal-Mart Statement of Ethics, supra note 108, at 2.
See id.
See Moberly, supra note 110.
See Hassink, et al., supra note 96, at 32.
18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(a)(1) & (a)(2) (Supp. IV 2004).
29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2000).
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this "protected activity" decision can leave whistleblowers
without coverage when they disclose misconduct not covered by
a particular statute. In the Sarbanes-Oxley study mentioned
above, administrative law judges dismissed 24.1% of whistleblower cases because the employee did not disclose the right
type of misconduct. 12 8 State statutory protection can provide
broader "protected activity" coverage than federal law; however, only a minority of states statutorily protect private-sector
whistleblowers. 129 Moreover, some states provide much more
limited protection. New York's whistleblower statute, for instance, restricts protection to employees who report a violation
of a law, rule, or regulation that poses a substantial danger to
the public health or safety. 130
Similarly, the wrongful discharge tort only protects employees who disclose a violation of "public policy"-a limitation
that some courts interpret narrowly. 13 1 For example, courts often determine that whistleblowers who disclose seemingly private misconduct, such as corporate embezzlement or bribery,
should not be protected because such wrongdoing does not af132
fect the public at large.
Corporate Codes, on the other hand, often promise to protect an employee who discloses any illegal or unethical activity
occurring within the corporation.
As noted above, the

128. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 113-14; see also Robert P. Riordan & Leslie
E. Wood, The Whistleblower Provisions of Sarbanes-Oxley:Discerning the Scope of
"ProtectedActivity" 24 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 95, 97 (2006) (noting that administrative law judges narrowly construe the protected activity requirement of
Sarbanes-Oxley).
129. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 77 (noting that seventeen
state statutes protect private-sector whistleblowers). Unlike federal statutes that
protect whistleblowers who report certain types of narrowly-defined misconduct,
state whistleblower statutes often protect employees who report any actual or
suspected violation of federal, state, or local laws. See id. at 80 (noting that a
"majority" of the seventeen anti-retaliation statutes provide such protection); id.
at App. B (listing states). For example, North Dakota's statute protects whistleblowers who disclose any violation of federal, state, or local law, ordinance, regulation, or rule. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-20. Some of these statutes also protect reporting of additional types of misconduct, such as health care providers that
violate ethical standards, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.932(1)(d), or standards of
patient care, see Conscientious Employee Protection Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:193 (West 2004).
130. See N.Y. LAB. LAW § 740.
131.
See discussion supra Part I.C.
132. See, e.g., Adler v. Am. Standard Corp., 830 F.2d 1303, 1305-07 (4th Cir.
1987) (involving whistleblower report of commercial bribery); Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 375, 380 (Cal. 1988) (embezzlement); Hayes v. Eateries,
Inc., 905 P.2d 778, 788 (Okla. 1995) (embezzlement).
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NASDAQ requires Codes to protect any employee reporting
"questionable" activity.133 The Wal-Mart Statement of Ethics
expands upon this language by prohibiting retaliation against
anyone who reports a suspected violation of "the law, applicable regulations or this Statement of Ethics or any other WalMart policy."' 134 The study of NYSE-listed Codes found that
many corporate Codes contain similarly broad language: 76.7%
of the Codes explicitly protect employees who report any illegal
activity, and ninety percent protect employees who report violations of the Code itself, which often includes illegalities as
well as ethical lapses and violations of internal policies. 135 The
European study found that over ninety-six percent of the whistleblower policies gave generalized examples of misconduct
that should be reported: breaches of internal policies of a Code
were mentioned in all of these policies, and sixty-six percent of
the policies stated that violations of the law or other regula36
tions should be reported. 1
This broader coverage should enable courts and administrative decision makers to avoid determining whether a whistleblower technically engaged in "protected activity" by reporting wrongdoing specifically covered by the tort of wrongful
discharge or by a particular statute. For example, in Fraser v.
Fiduciary Trust Co., 137 the court dismissed Sarbanes-Oxley
claims based on two instances of whistleblowing because the
employee's disclosure purportedly did not meet the Act's definition of "protected activity." 138 There, the employee wrote a
memo to his employer's human resources department alleging
that his supervisor ordered him to falsify the company's financial performance results. 139 He also wrote an email to the company's senior management asserting that the company failed to
follow its internal investment guidelines. 140 The court dismissed both Sarbanes-Oxley claims because the disclosures did
not allege any illegalities related to shareholder fraud. 14 1 The
court, however, permitted other claims to go forward under a

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

See NASDAQ INTERPRETATIVE MANUAL ONLINE § IM-4350-7.
See Wal-Mart Statement of Ethics, supra note 108, at 5.
See Moberly, supra note 110.
See Hassink, et al., supra note 96, at 36-37.
417 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 322-23.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 322-23.
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breach of contract theory based on the employer's antiretaliation policy. 142
Employees have also asserted Code-based claims to avoid a
narrow construction of the public policy tort. In Greene v.
Quest Diagnostics Clinical Laboratories, Inc., 143 an employee
alleged that she internally reported misconduct that violated
144
her employer's policies and several state and federal laws.
The court dismissed her claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy because South Carolina recognizes that
tort in only two circumstances: (1) when an employee must violate a criminal law as a condition of employment and (2) when
the act of discharging the employee is itself a violation of
criminal law. 14 5 However, the employee's claim regarding the
enforceability of a broad anti-retaliation promise in the em146
ployer's Compliance Manual survived summary judgment.
147
Harsh-bargerv. CSX Transportation,Inc.
provides another example. In that case, an employee reported his supervisor's harassing behavior to the company's human resources department and was later discharged. 14 8 The court dismissed the
employee's wrongful discharge tort claim because the employee
failed to identify a "clear mandate" of public policy that the
employer violated, as required by West Virginia law. 14 9 However, the employee's claim for "equitable estoppel/detrimental
reliance" survived because the employee sufficiently alleged
that he relied on the anti-retaliation provision of the company's
150
Code when he reported his supervisor's harassment.

142. Id. at 325.
143. 455 F. Supp. 2d 483 (D.S.C. 2006).
144. See id. at 487-88.
145. See id. at 489 (citing Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc., 422 S.E.2d 91,
92-93 (S.C. 1992); Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 337 S.E.2d 213, 21416 (S.C. 1985)).
146. See id. at 492 (finding that a jury should determine whether the antiretaliation promise was binding because the Compliance Manual did not contain a
disclaimer). It should be noted that the court ultimately found as a matter of law
that employee did not demonstrate that the employer breached the antiretaliation policy. Id. at 492-93.
147. 478 F. Supp. 2d 890 (S.D. W. Va. 2006).
148. See id. at 892.
149. See id. at 895.
150. See id. at 895-96.
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Good Faith Standard

Finally, Codes often protect employees who make whistleblower disclosures in "good faith," a more inclusive standard
than those typically provided in statutory and tort whistleblower protections. Indeed, the NYSE requires that companies
protect employees who make reports in "good faith." 15 1 Not
surprisingly, the survey of NYSE-listed companies found that
eighty percent included this standard, while two-thirds of the
others utilized similar language by protecting reports of "actual
or suspected" wrongdoing. 152 The European survey found that
seventy percent of company policies protected an employee
from retaliation if the employee made a "genuine/hon153
est/legitimate" or "good faith" whistleblower disclosure.
By contrast, many federal statutes require that whistleblowers have an objectively "reasonable belief' that the conduct
they disclose violates the law. 154 State statutes vary with regard to the level of knowledge the whistleblower needs to have
regarding the disclosed misconduct, requiring "objective reasonableness," "subjective good faith," or a disclosure that is "not
knowingly false." 155 In addition, courts have interpreted some
statutes, such as those in New York and Minnesota, to require
that the whistleblower report an actual violation of law in or56
der to be protected.1
As with statutory whistleblower protections, the common
law also provides different levels of protection to a whistleblower depending on the whistleblower's knowledge regarding
the violation disclosed. 15 7 Some jurisdictions protect a whistle151. See NYSE LISTING MANUAL § 303A.10. Wal-Mart's Statement of Ethics
contains this same protection for "good faith" whistleblowers. See Wal-Mart
Statement of Ethics, supra note 108, at 5.
152. See Moberly, supra note 110. Overall, only two of the thirty companies
did not use one of these two phrases when describing the type of disclosure required for protection. Interestingly, these companies did not utilize any standard
at all to describe the whistleblower's "belief' in the disclosure.
153. See Hassink et al., supra note 96, at 38 (noting that fifty-seven percent of
the policies required that reports be made in "good faith" and thirteen percent required "genuine/honest/legitimate" reports).
154. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (Supp. IV
2004).
155. WESTMAN & MODESI'r, supra note 11, at 81; see also Cherry, supra note
53, at 1047.
156. See WESTMAN & MODESITT,supra note 11, at 82 (citing Bordell v. General
Elec. Co., 667 N.E.2d 922 (N.Y. 1996) and Obst v. Microtron, Inc., 614 N.W.2d 196

(Minn. 2000)).
157.

See id. at 142.
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blower who has a "reasonable belief' that a legal violation occurred, 158 while others permit claims only from a whistleblower
who demonstrates that an actual violation of the law took
place. 159
The difference between a "good faith" standard and more
restrictive options presents more than a semantic choice. In
the recent Sarbanes-Oxley study, 14.5% of whistleblowers lost
their claim because an administrative law judge determined
that the whistleblower did not have an objectively reasonable
belief that an illegal activity occurred. 160 In application, this
"reasonable belief' standard arguably requires the whistleblower, in order to be protected, to prove that he or she disclosed an actual violation of law. 16 1 The "good faith" standard
set forth by many corporate Codes presents a burden more appropriately set to encourage rank-and-file employees to report
misconduct with confidence that they will be protected even if
they are mistaken about the illegality of the conduct they report.
C. ProceduralBenefits: Leveling the PlayingField
In addition to providing broader substantive protections,
enforcing anti-retaliation promises found in corporate Codes
would decrease the procedural advantages currently enjoyed by
employers in whistleblower litigation. By leveling the procedural playing field, contract protection can further encourage
whistleblowing and deter retaliation.
158. See, e.g., Schriner v. Meginnis Ford Co., 421 N.W.2d 755 (Neb. 1988).
159. See, e.g., Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463 (Okla. 2001).
160. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 102 tbl.4.
161. See, e.g., Welch v. Cardinal Bankshares Corp., ARB No. 05-065, slip op. at
11-12 (May 31, 2007) (overruling an administrative law judge's determination
that a CFO had a reasonable belief that his employer violated securities regulations); Allen v. Stewart Enterp., ARB No. 06-081, at 14 (July 27, 2006) (finding
that a "reasonable belief' that a statute has been violated means a high certainty
that the law has been broken). In Allen, the employee alleged that she examined
"internal consolidated financial statements" and that these statements indicated
that the company violated an SEC rule. See id. The ARB, however, found that
her disclosure of this potential SEC rule violation was not protected because these
internal reports did not have to be filed with the SEC, and therefore could not
have violated the rule. See id. Based on this nuance, the ARB found that the employee could not have "reasonably believed" that a violation of the rule occurred.
See id.; see also Jason M. Zuckerman, SOX's Whistleblower Provision: Promise
Unfulfilled, 4 SECURITIES LIT. REPORTER 14, 16-17 (July/Aug. 2007); cf. Brianne
J. Gorod, Rejecting Reasonableness, 56 AM. UNIV. L. REV. 1469, 1484-96 (2007)
(criticizing the "reasonable belief' standard because courts may use it to improperly reject retaliation claims under the opposition clause of Title VII).
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Longer Statute of Limitations

First, state contract claims typically provide a longer statute of limitations than many whistleblower statutes. Depending on the federal statute invoked, the statute of limitations for
retaliation claims can range from 30 to 180 days. 162 The statute of limitations" for retaliation under federal employee discrimination statutes can reach 300 days. 163 As with the federal
laws, state statutes have a variety of procedural requirements.
Some laws set forth limitations periods as short as ninety
days. 164
Similar to the substantive boundaries discussed
above, these short statutes of limitations can dramatically affect whistleblower claims. In the Sarbanes-Oxley study, administrative law judges dismissed over one-third of all cases
because the whistleblower failed to file a claim within the Act's
16 5
ninety-day statute of limitations.
By contrast, most states have a statute of limitations for
written contract claims of at least four years, 166 with some
states' limitation periods extending as long as ten to fifteen
years. 16 7 A longer statute of limitations can benefit whistleblowers in several ways. Most whistleblowers who consider
bringing claims previously lost their jobs due to employer retaliation. 168 As a result, whistleblowers need time to resolve
their immediate financial situation before they can decide
whether to sue their former employer, to find a competent at169
torney to investigate the claim, and to initiate a lawsuit.
162. See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6971 (2000) (30 days); International Safe Container Act, 46 U.S.C. § 80507 (2000) (60 days); SarbanesOxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV 2004) (90 days); Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (180 days).
163. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2)

(2000).
164. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 85 (noting that Connecticut
and Michigan have ninety-day limitations periods).
165. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 107-09.
166. See NATIONAL SURVEY OF STATE LAWS 531-45 (Richard A. Leiter ed., 6th
ed. 2007) (showing that all but five states have limitations periods of four years or
more for written contracts).
167. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 614.1(5) (2007) (10 years); OHIO. REV. CODE ANN.
§2305.06 (2007)(15 years).
168. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 132 n.274 (noting that 81.8% of SarbanesOxley whistleblowers alleged that they lost their job as part of an employer's retaliation).
169. Cf. Terry Morehead Dworkin, Sox and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV.
1757, 1763 (2007) (noting that "[miost potential claimants don't realize what their
rights are and how to pursue them in such a short [ninety-day statute of limitations] period").
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Furthermore, the statute of limitations for several whistleblower laws begins to run when the whistleblower first experiences or receives notice of a retaliatory adverse employment action. 170 This rule can place the time the employee received
notice of the action in dispute, often to the whistleblower's detriment. 17 1 A short limitations period exacerbates this kind of
dispute, while a longer period likely makes such distinctions
72
less problematic. 1
2.

Avoiding Administrative Investigations

Second, a whistleblower who brings a contract-based claim
may avoid the burden of an investigation by an administrative
agency. Although some federal statutes permit whistleblowers
to file claims directly in federal court, 173 others require whistleblowers to file claims with administrative agencies, such as
the Department of Labor. 174 In fact, fourteen federal statutes
require whistleblowers to file claims with the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") within the Department of Labor. 175 Some of these statutes, like the Occupational Safety and Health Act, permit only the agency to investigate and prosecute retaliation claims on an employee's
behalf. 176 Others permit employees to pursue their own claims
by requesting an administrative investigation, from which appeals can be made to an administrative law judge, then an administrative review board, and ultimately to a federal court of
appeals. 177 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 includes an additional procedural nuance. Whistleblowers who first file a claim
with OSHA are permitted to withdraw their claim and file in
federal district court if the agency does not complete its review
within 180 days. 178 Similarly, under New Hampshire's whistleblower statute, employees must file a claim with an adminis179
trative agency before filing a civil lawsuit.
170. See, e.g., Halpern v. XL Capital, Ltd., No. 04-120, at 3 (ARB Aug. 31,
2005) (applying rule to Sarbanes-Oxley case).
171. See id.
172. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 132-33.
173. See, e.g., Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1831j (2000).
174. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV
2004).
175. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 78 n.59.
176. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(§2).
177. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. §§ 1980.105, .106; .107, .110, & .112 (2006).
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(1)(B) (Supp. IV 2004).
179. See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 275-E:4(I)-(II) (2007).
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Some evidence suggests that administrative agencies may
not be as receptive to whistleblower claims as juries. In the
Sarbanes-Oxley study, OSHA found in favor of a whistleblower
in only 3.6% of its completed investigations. 180 Many claims
were resolved as a matter of law because OSHA determined
that they did not fall within Sarbanes-Oxley's coverage. 18 1
However, even in cases in which OSHA found that SarbanesOxley covered the claim, whistleblowers won only 10.7% of the
time. 182 By contrast, when whistleblowers can present a claim
to a jury, they have more success. A study of California cases
in 1998 and 1999 found that whistleblowers won wrongful dis183
charge jury trials sixty-three percent of the time.
Administrative procedures also impose unnecessary burdens on whistleblowers. At a minimum, statutes like Sarbanes-Oxley require a six-month holding period before a whistleblower can bring a claim in a judicial forum.
For an
employee who likely lost employment, this long delay can be a
substantial barrier to relief. Of equal significance, administrative investigations may not be as thorough as the discovery
process required for courtroom litigation. For example, under
some statutes, administrative investigators do not have subpoena power to require an employer to produce documents and
witnesses, and administrative regulations often require very
little cooperation from employers. 184 Those statutes that provide more power to investigators, such as the Occupational
Safety and Health Act, often give an administrative agency sole
discretion over whether to bring a claim of retaliation against
an employer, thus denying whistleblowers the opportunity to
have their claims heard by a court. 185
D. Normative Benefits: Enforcing Corporate SelfRegulation
Enforcing the anti-retaliation promises in corporate Codes
could provide substantive and procedural benefits to whistle180. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 91.
181. See id. at 103-04.
182. See id. at 120-21 (finding 10.7% win rate for "causation" cases).
183. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study
of CaliforniaEmployment Discriminationand Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts
Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511,
538 (2003).
184. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 125-26.
185. See 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2) (2000).
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blowers, which would lead to less retaliation and, correspondingly, more whistleblowing. As discussed above, more whistleblowing from insider employees provides a substantial public
benefit. In addition, enforcing anti-retaliation promises could
provide another, perhaps more subtle, normative benefit by encouraging the movement toward corporate self-regulation.
Although the movement has different labels,1 8 6 at its core
it involves attempting to make government regulation more effective by encouraging some level of self-regulation and permitting the regulated entities increased involvement in government oversight.' 8 7 Both advocates and critics of the movement
recognize that, to be effective, the government must either require or encourage corporations to adopt internal structures
that will detect and deter wrongdoing.1 8 8 In theory, these internal structures will supplement, replace, and, in some cases,
create government oversight in areas in which such oversight
is weak, compromised, or non-existent. Such internal structures might require whistleblower disclosure channels 8 9 and
mandate the use of internal rules and Codes of Ethics. 190 In
fact, a direct correlation exists between the increased use of
Codes and the growing prevalence of conscious self-regulation
186. See Krawiec, supra note 73, at 489-90 n.9 (noting that, in addition to the
author's label of "negotiated governance," a number of terms have been used to
describe such models, including " 'contractarian,' 'collaborative,' experimentalist,'
'problem solving,' 'empowered participatory,' 'enforced self-governance,' 'responsive regulation,' 'set of negotiated relationships,' and 'government-stakeholder
network structures' "); see also Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 324-25 (2005) (coining the term "monitored self-regulation").
187. See John Braithwaite, Enforced Self-Regulation: A New Strategy for Corporate Crime Control, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1466, 1467-70 (1982); Estlund, supra note
14, at 354-55 (describing "New Governance" advocates who believe that government regulation should "energize and motivate regulated actors themselves to collaborate in both the shaping and the enforcement of regulatory norms"); Krawiec,
supra note 73, at 490.
188. See, e.g., Braithwaite, supra note 187, at 1470-73 (proposing a model of
corporate self-regulation involving internally written and enforced rules); Estlund, supra note 186, at 319, 320-25; Krawiec, supra note 73, at 489; Susan
Sturm, Second GenerationEmployment Discrimination,101 COLUM. L. REV. 458,
479-89 (2001).
189. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A)
(Supp. 2002) (requiring corporations to implement avenues for employees to report misconduct to the Audit Committee of the company's Board of Directors); see
generally Moberly, supra note 7, at 1138-41 (discussing this "structural model" to
encourage corporate whistleblowers).
190. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 73, at 489; Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, §
406(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7264(a) (Supp. 2002) (requiring corporations to issue a Code of
Ethics for senior financial officers).
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strategies by the government.191 Two prominent commentators
suggest that the increased prevalence of corporate Codes partially results from the "deeply rooted" American concept "that
self-regulation within an industry is preferable to and more ef192
fective than government regulation."'
Using structural requirements to encourage self-regulation
can be problematic, however, because the government rarely
enforces compliance with its mandates regarding these internal
mechanisms.
Once corporations implement self-regulatory
structures, the government engages in little oversight to ensure
their effectiveness. 193 For example, under Sarbanes-Oxley,
corporations must disclose only whether they have implemented a Code of Business Conduct-the government plays no role
in monitoring or enforcing the corporation's published Code.
Similarly, although Sarbanes-Oxley requires corporations to
enact a "whistleblower disclosure channel" to permit employees
to disclose misconduct to the board of directors, no one moni194
tors the effectiveness of these channels.
Even where the government has a distinct role in assessing internal compliance programs, the evaluation rarely rises
beyond a superficial, "check-the-box" approach. Courts presented with a Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense, for example, simply require employers to produce harassment policies
and provide sexual harassment training to employees. 195 Lax
government oversight encourages corporations to implement
"window-dressing": structures that appear effective but do little
to change corporate culture or legal compliance. 196 Professor
191. Krawiec, supra note 73, at 489-90.
192. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1574.
193. See Krawiec, supra note 73, at 536-37.
194. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 1167-72.
195. See Anne Lawton, Operating in an Empirical Vacuum: The Ellerth and
Faragher Affirmative Defense, 13 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 197, 212 (2004) (concluding after conducting an empirical study of federal court decisions regarding
the Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense that "the lower federal courts have interpreted the employer's obligations and burden of proof so that employers have
little incentive to do anything besides promulgate policies and procedures that
look good on paper"); see also Samuel Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the
Limits of AntidiscriminationLaw, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 24 (2006) (summarizing research demonstrating that lower courts implementing the Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense "have been satisfied by mere paper compliance").
196. See Krawiec, supra note 73, at 491 ("[A] growing body of evidence indicates that internal compliance structures do not deter prohibited conduct within
firms, and may largely serve a window-dressing function that provides both market legitimacy and reduced legal liability."); see also Lawrence A. Cunningham,
The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls To Fight Fraud,Terrorism, Other Ills,
29 J. CORP. L. 267, 314 (2003-04).
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Kimberly Krawiec labels this problem "cosmetic compliance"
and suggests that the lack of enforcement can fail to effectively
19 7
deter corporate misconduct.
Thus, although great promises can be made in corporate
Codes, little external enforcement of these promises exists.
Little internal enforcement exists either. 198 For a Code to
work, employees must be sanctioned when they do not adhere
to the Code's precepts. 199 Yet corporations have difficulty enforcing the provisions of their own Codes. 20 0 Social scientists
note that "violations [of Codes] are frequent, and compliance is
a major practical problem." 20 1 Empirical evidence suggests
that, despite their pervasiveness, corporate ethics Codes rarely
modify employee behavior. 20 2 Codes also fail to change organizational culture because they often lack internal "compliance
institutions," such as an ethics committee, an ombudsman office, or an adjudication committee that can oversee and implement the lofty mandates set forth in Codes. 20 3 To work, Codes
need these institutions to "interpret the [C]ode, clarify it, apply
it to quandaries, resolve ambiguities and contradictions, communicate it, conduct ethical audits and enforce the Code by adjudicating on alleged violations and responding to those found

197. See Krawiec, supra note 73, at 489-90.
198. See Harry W. Arthurs, CorporateCodes of Conduct: Profit, Power and Law
in the Global Economy, in ETHICS CODES, CORPORATIONS AND THE CHALLENGE OF
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 71, at 51, 52-53.
199. See Veronica Besmer, The Legal Characterof Private Codes of Conduct:
More than Just a Pseudo-Formal Gloss on Corporate Social Responsibility, 2
HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 279, 302 (2006).
200. See Earl A. Molander, A Paradigm for Design, Promulgation and Enforcement of Ethical Codes, 6 J. BUS. ETHICS 619, 629 (1987) ("The most problematic aspect of implementing an ethical code is code enforcement."); see also Pitt &
Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1602 ("[S]tudies suggest that the weakest element in compliance programs rests with enforcement."); Note, The Good, the Bad,
and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and the Problems
with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2123, 2125-27 (2003) (arguing
that corporate codes likely cannot decrease corporate crime because they are hard
to enforce).
201. Andrew Brien, Regulating Virtue: Formulating,Engendering and Enforcing CorporateEthical Codes, 15 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 21, 22 (1996).
202. See also M. MATTHEWS, STRATEGIC INTERVENTION IN ORGANIZATIONS 76
(1988) (conducting survey of 212 codes from large companies and concluding that
little relationship exists between codes and corporate violations of the law); Kimberly Krawiec, OrganizationalMisconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32
FLA. ST. L. REV. 571, 591 (2005) (noting that little empirical evidence suggests
that codes of ethics modify employee behavior); cf. Schwartz, supra note 96, at 2728 (reviewing studies of the influence of codes on corporate behavior and finding
"mixed" results).
203. See Brien, supra note 201, at 22-23.
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to have violated it. ' ' 204 Current Codes usually do not contain
such enforcement provisions. When they do, the provisions are
205
often general and vague.
Permitting whistleblowers to enforce a Code's antiretaliation protection can address these problems, at least in
part, and improve the effort to encourage compliance through
self-regulation. 20 6 First, whistleblowers can supplement weak
formal enforcement mechanisms by providing informal internal
enforcement. 20 7 For employees to successfully carry out this
enforcement function, whistleblowers need to be protected by
credible and enforceable promises of non-retaliation. 2 08 Without such promises, shareholders and other interested parties
cannot rely on the effectiveness of an internal compliance system based in part on employee monitoring. 209 Allowing whistleblowers to enforce contractual promises of non-retaliation
could encourage them by providing real promises upon which
they can rely. Increasing the willingness of employees to blow
the whistle on violations of corporate Codes should help enforce
and improve internal compliance with the Code's other provisions.
Second, contractual enforcement of anti-retaliation promises will support recent efforts to encourage whistleblowers by
providing structural disclosure channels or "hotlines" to facilitate internal reports of misconduct. 2 10 Some recent efforts

204. Id. at 23-24.
205. See Pitt & Groskaufmanis, supra note 71, at 1604-05.
206. Cf. Estlund, supra note 186, at 374-77 (noting the importance of protecting whistleblowers from retaliation in order to create a program of corporate selfregulation).
207. See Brien, supra note 201, at 38 (arguing that an important part of "engendering" the code into corporate culture is enforcing the code by, in part, encouraging "reporting and disclosure" by employees); Pagnattaro & Peirce, supra
note 74, at 392-93.
208. See, e.g., TREADWAY COMMISSION, supra note 78, at 35-36 ("The code of
corporate conduct should protect employees who use these internal procedures
against reprisal. Failure to adopt guarantees against reprisal as well as to provide an effective internal complaint procedure could undermine the vitality of
codes of conduct ..
"); Barnett et al., supra note 96, at 129; Hassink et al., supra
note 96, at 38; Schwartz, supra note 96, at 35, 39; Weller, supra note 96, at 394.
209. See Braithwaite, supra note 187, at 1483 (discussing the need for public
monitoring of the corporation's private enforcement of its own rules); Pagnattaro
& Peirce, supra note 74, at 392; see also Estlund, supra note 14, at 370; Schwartz,
supra note 96, at 39-40 (noting that a survey of employees at four Canadian companies uniformly found that the company employees did not perceive the company
as providing sufficient protection from retaliation for reporting violations of the
code, "despite written guarantees in the codes').
210. See generally Moberly, supra note 7 (discussing the "structural model" to
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stem from the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requirement that all publicly-traded corporations have hotlines for reporting accounting
problems and fraud. 2 11 Permitting contractual enforcement of
the anti-retaliation promises made as part of these whistleblower disclosure channels will make whistleblower hotlines
more effective, because employees will be able to rely on employer promises not to retaliate against them for using the hotline. A breach of contract action against an employer that fails
to operate whistleblower disclosure channels as promised provides another mechanism to force corporations to take their internal whistleblower hotlines seriously and helps ensure that
whistleblower hotlines become an integral part of corporate
2 12
monitoring.
Third, contract protection could bring to light important information about the effectiveness of particular Codes. Shareholders and the government lack sufficient oversight over a
corporation's enforcement of its own Code due, at least in part,
to the fact that courts and prosecutors have difficulty evaluating the effectiveness of a Code-based internal compliance system. Yet as Professor John Braithwaite recognizes, two elements are necessary for enforced self-regulation to be effective:
(1) public enforcement of internal rules and (2) public monitoring of private enforcement of the rules. 2 13 Permitting a whistleblower to bring a breach of contract claim will partially address those needs by enabling the public to glimpse the process
by which a particular corporation implements its Code. Specifically, shareholders and the government would have a better
sense of a corporation's efforts to detect fraud and other internal misconduct. In this way, a whistleblower's breach of contract claim may provide a unique perspective on at least one
aspect of the true effectiveness of a corporation's compliance
system.

encourage whistleblowers).
211. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-l(m)(4)(A) (Supp. IV
2004).
212. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 1141-61 (discussing benefits of whistleblower disclosure channels).
213. See Braithwaite, supra note 187, at 1483.

1012

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

III. THE HANDBOOK DOCTRINE'S HURDLES TO CONTRACT
PROTECTION

The anti-retaliation promises made by corporations in
their Codes could potentially supplement current statutory and
common law tort whistleblower protections and provide further
societal benefits. However, most U.S. jurisdictions presume an
at-will employment relationship with limited exceptions for
employer promises. 2 14 Thus, contract protection depends upon
whether whistleblowers can fit this new type of anti-retaliation
protection into an at-will exception.
In recent years when employees attempted to enforce antiretaliation promises found in corporate Codes, they primarily
utilized the "handbook doctrine," an exception to the at-will
rule for employer promises in employee handbooks or manuals. 2 15 This doctrine developed in the last few decades, and today a majority of U.S. jurisdictions accept that at-will employees may enforce some promises contained in employee handbooks. 2 16 While state-by-state variations occur in the details of
the doctrine, 2 17 courts and employees most frequently rely upon
"breach of implied contract" or "promissory estoppel" theories
2 18
to examine handbook promises.
214. See Robert C. Bird, Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PENN. J.
LABOR & EMP. L. 149, 175 (2005) ("Courts have been reluctant to enforce corporate
codes as enforceable promises."); see also Ayres & Brown, ENDA, supra note 13, at
1672-76 (describing the "uncertain legal effect of nondiscrimination policies" and
noting that "in some jurisdictions the majestic language of 'policies' does not give
rise to legally binding 'promises' ").
215. See, e.g., Lobosco v. New York Tel. Co./NYNEX, 751 N.E.2d 462, 465 (N.Y.
2001); Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 128 (Wash.
2005); Younker v. Eastern Assoc. Coal Corp., 591 S.E.2d 254, 258 (W. Va. 2003).
216. See Stephen F. Befort, Employee Handbooks and the Legal Effect of Disclaimers, 13 INDUS. REL. L.J. 326, 328, 334-35 (1992); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt &
Timothy A. Haley, Governance of the Workplace: The Contemporary Regime of Individual Contract, 28 COMP. LABOR L. & POL'Y J. 313, 344 (2007).
217. See, e.g., Rachel Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee Handbooks: The Creation of a Common Law Information-ElicitingPenalty
Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 718 (2005); Schroeder, supra note 93, at
582-83 (summarizing various judicial approaches to the handbook exception); J.
Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspectiveon Indefinite Term Contracts:Resolving
the Just Cause Debate, 1995 WISC. L. REV. 837, 845-46.
218. See Befort, supranote 216, at 340-48 (noting that courts typically analyze
handbook cases under a unilateral contract or a promissory estoppel theory, or
both); Gabriel S. Rosenthal, Crafting a New Means of Analysis for Wrongful Discharge Claims Based on Promises in Employee Handbooks, 71 WASH. L. REV.
1157, 1167 (1996) (identifying "two main theories: unilateral contract and equitable principles"); Jason A. Walters, Comment, The Brooklyn Bridge is Falling
Down: Unilateral Contract Modification and the Sole Requirement of the Offeree's
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Under either theory, three aspects of the handbook doctrine play significant roles in whistleblower cases based on
Codes: (1) proving a specific promise, (2) demonstrating a whistleblower's reliance on the promise, and (3) avoiding the inevitable employer attempt to disclaim any potential promise by
emphasizing an employee's at-will status in the Code itself.
Each of these three elements can be a daunting hurdle for an
employee attempting to enforce a Code's anti-retaliation prom2 19
ise.
A.

The First Hurdle:A Specific Promise

First, to enforce a statement under the handbook doctrine,
the statement's language must be definite enough that the em22 0
ployee could reasonably construe it as a promissory offer.
Broad policy provisions or vague language about job security
typically cannot overcome the at-will presumption. 22 1 This
element of specificity plays a strong role under both "implied
contract" and "promissory estoppel" theories. 222 The more specific the language in the handbook, the more likely courts are
22 3
to construe it as an "offer" for implied contract purposes.

Assent, 32 CUMB. L. REV. 375, 379 (2002). Employees have brought claims for
breach of implied contract, see, e.g., Lobosco, 751 N.E.2d at 464; Nichols v. Xerox
Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003); Younker, 591 S.E.2d at 256,
and using reliance theories, such as promissory estoppel or detrimental reliance,
see, e.g., Jordon v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 348 (4th Cir. 2006)
(asserting a detrimental reliance claim); Harshbarger v. CSX Transp., Inc., 478 F.
Supp. 2d 890, 895 (S.D. W. Va. 2006) (asserting claim for "equitable estoppelldetrimental reliance"); Lord v. Souder, 748 A.2d 393, 398 (Del. Super. Ct.
2000) (asserting a promissory estoppel claim).
219, Generalizing the outcomes of the case law in this area can be difficult because the law varies among jurisdictions, and the particular wording of any particular promise obviously plays a crucial role in the decision in any individual
case. However, the following review of the cases involving anti-retaliation promises in corporate Codes reveals that, regardless of the outcome in a particular
case, these elements played important roles in courts' analyses.
220. See, e.g., Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hosp. Ctr., 505 N.E.2d 314,
318 (Ill. 1987); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 626-30 (Minn.
1983); see also Levy, supra note 217, at 705-06; Schroeder, supra note 93, at 583
("[T]he major obstacle to handbook enforcement in the first generation of litigation about the doctrine was vague language. Lack of definitive employer promises
has doomed many claims."); Verkerke, supranote 217, at 846.
221. See LEX K. LARSON, UNJUST DISMISSAL § 8.021] (2006); Deborah A.
Schmedemann & Judi McLean Parks, Contract Formation and Employee Handbooks: Legal, Psychological, and Empirical Analyses, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
647, 659-60 (1994).
222. See Schmedemann & Parks, supra note 221, at 658-60.
223. See, e.g., Duldulao, 505 N.E.2d at 318 (noting that the handbook "must
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Similarly, under a promissory estoppel theory, specific promises within a handbook increase the likelihood that a court will
find that the employee reasonably relied upon the statement. 224
Cases involving Code anti-retaliation provisions follow this
same pattern. Courts rarely enforce general whistleblower
policies and more frequently enforce specific anti-retaliation
promises. 2 25 At one end of the spectrum, courts usually deny
claims based on Code provisions that attempt to encourage
whistleblowers, but that do not explicitly protect them from retaliation. For example, courts reject contract claims based on
Codes that provide an "open door" policy for employees to report misconduct 226 or utilize broad language such as statements that employees should "feel free to make suggestions
and complaints." 22 7 Courts reject employee claims for lack of
specificity even where the Code requires or recommends that
employees report misconduct. 228 At least one court refused to
recognize a contract claim based on a statement that the employer would not "tolerate" retaliation against whistleblowers,
because the statement lacked a specific anti-retaliation prom22 9
ise to the actual employee.

contain a promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably believe that
an offer has been made").
224. See Befort, supra note 216, at 344 ("[Clourts tend to find 'promises' in circumstances similar to those in which they find 'offers' under a unilateral contract
theory.").
225. See infra text accompanying notes 225-37.
226. See, e.g., Catalane v. Gilian Instrument Corp., 638 A.2d 1341, 1350 (N.J.
1994) (holding that a policy that encouraged "open communication" was not enforceable as an implied contract for whistleblower protection); Adcox v. SCT Products, 1997 WL 638275, at *4 n.1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (finding that language in
Code of Ethics and Business Conduct Guidelines, which stated that "[m]anagers
and supervisors also are responsible for maintaining a work environment where
constructive, frank, and open discussion is encouraged and expected, without fear
of retaliation," failed to contain binding language).
227. Tripodi v. Johnson & Johnson, 877 F. Supp. 233, 238 (D.N.J. 1995) (finding that the Johnson & Johnson Credo "does not approach the definitiveness" required for enforcement).
228. See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1991);
(noting that K-Mart's Policy on Integrity and Conflict of Interest recommended
that employees report unusual activities to management); Sabetay v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 506 N.E.2d 919, 923 (N.Y. 1987) (Hancock, J., concurring) (noting that
the Code on which the claim was based stated that, "It is the responsibility of
every employee promptly to report to General Counsel any knowledge of infractions of this policy").
229. See Riel v. Morgan Stanley, 2007 WL 541955 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (refusing to
enforce corporate Code, which stated that employer "will not tolerate any kind of
retaliation for reports or complaints regarding the misconduct of others that were
made in good faith").
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At the other end of the spectrum, some courts recognize
that the specificity of an anti-retaliation promise can permit an
employee to overcome the at-will presumption. In New York,
courts find that a sufficiently explicit anti-retaliation promise
limits an employer's termination rights, 2 30 despite the New
York courts' traditional rejection of implied and good faith contractual limitations on at-will employment. 23 1 In Korslund v.
DynCorp Tri-Cities Services, Inc.,2 32 the Washington Supreme
Court found that the specificity of a Code's anti-retaliation
promise permitted a whistleblower's claim to go forward under
23 3
the equitable promissory estoppel doctrine.
At least one case made explicit the distinction between an
unenforceable general policy statement on the one hand and an
enforceable specific anti-retaliation provision on the other. In
Belgasem v. Water Pik Technologies, Inc.,2 34 the court refused
to enforce anti-discrimination and anti-harassment policies
contained in the company's "Ethics and Compliance Guidelines," because the policies were merely "general statement[s]
of values" not enforceable under Colorado law. 23 5 By contrast,
the court enforced another part of those same Guidelines, entitled "Duty to Report Violations," which stated: "It is the duty of
every employee who discovers a violation of Company policy to
'236
report the violation immediately, without fear of reprisal.

230. See, e.g., Loli v. Standard Charter Bank, 160 Fed. App'x 20, at *1 (2d Cir.
2005) (finding that anti-retaliation policy was "sufficiently committal under New
York law to raise an issue of fact); Frasier v. Fiduciary Trust Co., Int'l, 417 F.
Supp. 2d 310, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Brady v. Calyon Securities, 406 F. Supp. 2d
307, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Navarte v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No.
96CIV8133, 1998 WL 690059, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998); Criado v. ITT Corp.,
1993 WL 322837, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
208 A.D.2d 301, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
231. See Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, 506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987) (requiring
an "express" limitation on the employer's right to discharge); Murphy v. Am.
Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (same); see also Brady, 406 F.
Supp. 2d at 315 ("New York law carves out only a few very narrow exceptions to
the at-will employment doctrine."). But see Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y.
1992) (permitting law firm associate to sue for breach of implied contract based, in
part, upon unique lawyer-client relationship).
232. 125 P.3d 119 (Wash. 2005).
233. See id. at 128 (noting that the specific treatment claim "is not an implied
or express contract claim, but is independent of a contractual analysis and instead
rests on a justifiable reliance theory").
234. 457 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (D. Colo. 2006).
235. Id. at 1220. This section of the Guidelines stated that it was the company
policy not to discriminate on the basis of any protected category and that the company would not tolerate sexual harassment. See id.
236. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court found this language to be "sufficiently definite" to
form a contractual obligation to not retaliate against whistle23 7
blowers.
However, even when analyzing an employer's explicit antiretaliation promise, courts do not consistently permit an employee to bring a claim based on that promise. For example, in
Younker v. Eastern Association Coal Corporation,2 38 the employer's Code of Business Conduct stated, "All employees are
encouraged and obligated to report any known or suspected
Code violations to the employee's supervisor and the appropriate Counsel. No disciplinary or other retaliatory action will be
taken against an employee making such a report. '239 Despite
the seeming specificity of this final sentence, the West Virginia
Supreme Court denied a whistleblower's breach of contract
claim because the Code provision "embodied only aspirational
goals rather than contractual terms. '240 Similarly, in Marsh v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc.,24 1 the employer issued a document called
"Help Preserve Delta's High Standard of Business Conduct" in
which the employer stated that "[n]o disciplinary action will be
'242
taken against an employee solely for disclosing wrongdoing.
Again, despite a seemingly explicit promise of non-retaliation,
the court refused to enforce the Code provision because the
statements "do not set forth any employment terms, explain
disciplinary procedures, or detail any prohibited conduct. Instead, the statements are best characterized as 'vague assur'24 3
ances' that cannot be the basis for an implied contract.
Thus, for the most part, courts analyzing anti-retaliation
promises follow the general handbook doctrine by enforcing
statements construed as specific promises of non-retaliation
and not enforcing statements construed as general or vague
statements of policy. However, the at-will presumption remains strong enough in some jurisdictions, such as West Virginia and Colorado, that courts refuse to enforce even precise
and explicit promises.

237. Id. The court subsequently found that the employee did not produce sufficient evidence that the employer breached this contractual obligation. See id. at
1220-21.
238. 591 S.E.2d 254 (W. Va. 2003).
239. Id. at 257.
240. Id. at 259.
241. 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997).
242. Id. at 1466-67
243. Id. (quoting Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1465-66 (10th
Cir. 1994)).
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The Second Hurdle: Employee Reliance on the Promise

Second, when courts apply the handbook doctrine, they
typically require that the employee knows about a handbook
promise and that the employee relies upon it. 244 Not surprisingly, the reliance element almost always appears in promissory estoppel cases. 24 5 However, even courts that examine an
implied contract theory will consider the extent to which an
employee relied upon a promise. Courts in those cases equate
the promise with a contractual "offer," and reliance demonstrates the important contractual element that the employee
2 46
had knowledge of the offer.
Courts traditionally accept one of two theories regarding
reliance. Under one theory, courts strictly interpret the reliance element to require that the employee-plaintiff demonstrate actual reliance on a handbook promise. For example, a
court might require the employee to prove that the employee
read the provision and acted because of the promise. 24 7 Other
jurisdictions accept a broader view of reliance, typically based

upon the seminal case, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Michigan.248 In that case, the Michigan Supreme Court held
that courts should presume an employee relies upon handbook
promises when the employer publishes the handbook to the entire work force. 24 9 General distribution of a handbook satisfies
the reliance element in jurisdictions that follow Toussaint,
without the need for the employee to demonstrate actual, individualized reliance on the promise.
However, when courts apply the handbook doctrine to
Code anti-retaliation promises, they consistently require individualized, rather than generalized, employee reliance. Even
courts that approve of the "specificity" of a particular anti244. See Levy, supra note 217, at 705.
245. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981); Befort, supra
note 216, at 344.
246. See, e.g., Loli v. Standard Chartered Bank, 160 Fed. App'x 20, 2005 WL
3263831, at *2 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting that plaintiff met his burden of alleging reliance on an implied contract claim); Navarte v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No.
96CIV8133 (JGK)(SEG), 1998 WL 690059, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998);
Criado v. ITT Corp., No. 92 CIV 3552, 1993 WL 17305, at *5-7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19,
1993); Kurth v. Vencor, Inc., No. 02-C-0213-C, 2002 WL 32349402, at *4 (W.D.
Wis. July 16, 2002).
247. See, e.g., Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 131
(Wash. 2005); see also Befort, supra note 216, at 344-45.
248. 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980).
249. See id. at 892; see also Befort, supra note 216, at 344-45.
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retaliation promise seem to require a high level of reliance by
the employee to bring a contract claim. In the Korslund case
mentioned above, the Washington Supreme Court seemingly
gave enhanced protection to whistleblowers by recognizing the
enforceability of a very specific anti-retaliation promise. 250 But
because the court relied upon a promissory estoppel theory, the
court in the same case emphasized the importance of individualized reliance on the specific promise. The court required the
whistleblower to establish that "the employee was aware of the
specific promise allegedly breached and that specific promise
must have induced the employee to remain on the job and not
seek other employment. ' 25 1 The court rejected the Touissant
conclusion that an employee could show reliance generally
based upon "an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment"
2 52
created by a handbook's promises.
Similarly, courts that utilize a breach of contract theory
also emphasize the importance of individualized reliance. New
York courts that enforce anti-retaliation promises still require
that to prevail, a whistleblower demonstrate specific reliance
on the promise. 253 One court went so far as to assert that the
whistleblower must allege reliance on the promise at the time
the employee began employment, rather than when he blew the
whistle. 2 54 Courts in other jurisdictions agree that employees
who bring this type of breach of contract claim must satisfy the
2 55
crucial element of reliance.
In short, the "reliance" element of the handbook doctrine
often proves to be more onerous to whistleblowers than the
specificity requirement. Even if a court accepts the specificity
of an anti-retaliation promise, an employee who reports misconduct also must demonstrate that the employee blew the
whistle explicitly because of the employee's reliance on the employer's promise not to retaliate.
250.
251.
252.
253.

See Korslund, 125 P.3d at 128.
Id. at 131. (emphasis added).
Id.
See Loli v. Standard Chartered Bank, 160 Fed. App'x 20, at *2 (2d Cir.

2005) (noting that employee "has met his burden [on summary judgment] by alleging that he relied on the speak-up policy in deciding to report perceived misconduct and in relocating from Peru to New York, away from his family"); Narvarte v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 96-Civ.-8133 (JGK)(SEG), 1998 WL
690059, at *2 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998).
254. See Mirabella v. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., No. 01-Civ.-5563(BSJ), 2003 WL
21146657, at *3 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2003).
255. See, e.g., Kruth v. Vencor, Inc., No. 02-C-0213-C, 2002 WL 32349402, at *4
(W.D. Wis. July 16, 2002).
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The Third Hurdle: Employers Disclaiming the
Promise

Third, courts typically will not enforce handbook provisions
if the handbook contains a "clear and conspicuous" disclaimer
256
that proclaims the employment relationship to be at-will.
For breach of implied contract claims, a disclaimer contradicts
the employee's assertion that the employer intended a contractual obligation to arise out of a handbook promise. 257 For
promissory estoppel claims, a disclaimer undermines the argument that the employee's reliance on a handbook promise
was reasonable. 2 58 Although disputes may arise about whether
courts should enforce a disclaimer that lacks sufficient prominence or whether any ambiguity or lack of clarity undermines
the effect of the disclaimer, employers in most jurisdictions can
avoid handbook claims on the basis of a well-drafted disclaimer.

259

The presence of a disclaimer has prevented numerous employees from enforcing anti-retaliation promises in corporate
Codes. Regardless of the specificity of the promise or the employee's reliance on it, courts routinely do not enforce an antiretaliation promise if the employer issued a disclaimer that
clearly announced the at-will status of the employee. 2 60 For
example, although New York courts have upheld antiretaliation promises in Codes without disclaimers, 2 6 1 the presence of a disclaimer can be dispositive. In Lobosco v. New York

256. See, e.g., Befort, supra note 216, at 348-49; Fischl, supra note 56, at 195
(noting that state courts are "virtually unanimous" in enforcing clear and conspicuous disclaimers); Schroeder, supra note 93, at 583; see also Leikvold v. Valley
View Community Hosp., 688 P.2d 170, 174 (Ariz. 1984); Woolley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1271 (N.J. 1985); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co.,
685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984).
257. See Befort, supra note 216, at 349.
258. See id. at 349.
259. See id. at 351-56; Schmedemann & Parks, supra note 221, at 661-63.
260. See, e.g., Belline v. K-Mart Corp., 940 F.2d 184, 189-90 (7th Cir. 1991);
Jones v. Sabis Educ. Sys., Inc., 52 F. Supp. 2d 868, 874-75 (N.D. fll. 1999); Lobosco v. New York Tele. Co./NYNEX, 751 N.E.2d 462, 465 (N.Y. 2001).
261. See, e.g., Loli v. Standard Charter Bank, 160 Fed. App'x 20, at *1 (2d Cir.
2005) (finding that anti-retaliation policy was "sufficiently committal under New
York law to raise an issue of fact); Frasier v. Fiduciary Trust Co., Int'l, 417 F.
Supp. 2d 310, 324-25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Brady v. Calyon Securities, 406 F. Supp. 2d
307, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Navarte v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No.
96CIV8133, 1998 WL 690059, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998); Criado v. ITT Corp.,
1993 WL 322837, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Mulder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
208 A.D.2d 301, 307 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995).
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Telephone Co. /NYNEX, 262 the employer issued a Code stating
that "NYNEX assures protection against any form of reprisal
for reporting actual or suspected violations of our Code of Business Conduct. '2 63 On the page facing this statement, the employer made this disclaimer: "This [C]ode of conduct is not a
contract of employment and does not contain any contractual
rights of any kind between NYNEX and it[s] employees . . .
NYNEX can terminate [employees'] employment at any time
and for any reason ....,,264 The Court held that the disclaimer
negated any protection the employee might have inferred from
265
the Code's anti-retaliation promise.
Some courts enforce at-will disclaimers no matter where
they appear, even if they have only a tenuous connection to the
Code anti-retaliation promise on which an employee relies. For
example, one court refused to allow a contract claim based on a
Code promise because a separate document, the employee's application, contained an at-will disclaimer. 266 However, other
courts take a more employee-friendly approach when considering similar situations and refuse to enforce disclaimers located
in documents other than the Code containing the anti2 67
retaliation promise.
An employer's ability to include a disclaimer reaffirming
the employee's at-will status could be devastating to contractual enforcement of a Code's anti-retaliation provision. 268 To

262. 751 N.E.2d 462, 465 (N.Y. 2001).
263. See id. at 464.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 465.
266. See Wolf v. F&M Banks, 534 N.W.2d 877, 879-80, 882 (Wis. App. 1995).
267. See, e.g., Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d
483, 486 (D.S.C. 2006) (finding that a jury must determine whether an antiretaliation promise was binding because the promise was not accompanied by an
at-will disclaimer); Korslund v. DynaCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119,
129-30 (Wash. 2005) (finding that an at-will disclaimer in an employment application did not preclude employee reliance on an anti-retaliation promise in the
employee handbook); Nichols v. Xerox Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (N.Y. App.
Div. 2003) (holding that Code of Ethics may be enforceable even though a separate employee manual contained an at-will disclaimer because the Code of Ethics
itself did not contain a disclaimer). These differences among cases involving antiretaliation provisions reflect the diversity of judicial views regarding the adequacy
of the disclaimer, which according to one scholar are "all over the board." Schroeder, supra note 93, at 585.
268. See Jonathan Fineman, The Inevitable Demise of the Implied Employment Contract 40 (Sept. 17, 2007) (unpublished manuscript on file with author),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1015136
("Over time, courts became increasingly likely to value employers' express disclaimer or at-will provision over
employees' assertion that employers' conduct gave rise to an implied understand-
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the extent that an employer does not want exposure for contract liability, the employer could simply include a sufficient
disclaimer as part of any whistleblower policy. Most courts
would dismiss an employee's contract claim based upon such a
disclaimer. The next Part presents possible remedies for this
problem.
IV. OVERCOMING THE HANDBOOK DOCTRINE'S HURDLES

Taken together, these cases demonstrate that courts' inflexible application of the handbook doctrine can present substantial difficulties to employees who attempt to enforce Code
anti-retaliation promises. Some courts refuse to enforce the
type of anti-retaliation promises currently required of publiclytraded companies if the promise lacks specificity. Moreover,
even courts that might be willing to find a Code's antiretaliation promise specific enough to overcome the at-will presumption also require individualized reliance on the promise by
the employee. Furthermore, courts almost universally permit
employers to avoid liability for any anti-retaliation promise
with a sufficiently specific disclaimer reaffirming an employee's
at-will status.
Such rigid application of the handbook doctrine to Code
anti-retaliation promises ignores significant differences between Code promises and employee handbooks, and between
the types of claims brought by employees to enforce statements
made in both. As explained in more detail below, these differences suggest that advocates, courts, and regulators should adjust their view of Code-based contract claims in order to recognize the Code's interplay with broader corporate governance
concerns.
A. DistinguishingCodes from Handbooks
A company uses an employee handbook to communicate a
variety of information to its employees. As a result, these
manuals contain a wide range of policies, from broad procedures regarding employment termination to minutiae about
computer usage. The law does not require a company to publish and distribute a handbook; however, human resource professionals routinely recommend that employers maintain an
ing of job security.").
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extensive employee manual for several reasons. Manuals can
set employee expectations and inform workers of various workplace rules. Moreover, to the extent handbooks appear to implement a fair set of procedures and rules for employees, distributing handbooks can increase employee loyalty and morale.26 9 Further, handbooks can limit managerial discretion
about the application of various workplace rules, and thereby
decrease an employer's exposure to liability. Thus, handbooks
traditionally have focused on communicating information internally to employees and managers in order to achieve benefits for the company vis-A-vis these internal constituencies.
A Code also serves this internal function, and often substantial overlap exists between the content of a Code and a
handbook. Additionally, though, Codes play a role in a larger
corporate regulatory system aimed at providing information to
an external audience of shareholders and regulators. As discussed above, the SEC and the stock exchanges now require
publicly-traded companies to publish Codes on the internet or
otherwise provide them to their shareholders so they can
270
evaluate a company's corporate governance internal controls.
Although the regulations about Codes demand relatively few
substantive provisions, a company must promise antiretaliation protection to corporate employees as part of its
Code. 27' This promise has thus become an important part of
the overall corporate monitoring structure.
The benefits a company receives from a Code include substantial external benefits related to legal and regulatory compliance in addition to the internal benefits provided by more
general handbooks.
By publishing a Code with an antiretaliation promise, a publicly-traded company receives the
269. See, e.g., In re Certified Question: Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443
N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892-95 (Mich. 1980) ("The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal
work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and
the conviction that he will be treated fairly."); Befort, supra note 216, at 337-38;
Paul Berks, Social Change and Judicial Response: The Handbook Exception to
Employment-at-Will, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL. J. 231, 265-68 (2000) (noting
that many employers distributed handbooks in the midst of an anti-union battle);
Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract
Law and the "InvisibleHandshake" 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 903, 921 n.77 (1985) (citing
to cases in which employer receives "non-quantifiable yet tangible economic benefits" from handbook promises); Levy, supra note 217, at 721; Schmedemann &
Parks, supra note 221, at 666 (citing studies that indicate employer policies may
increase employee loyalty).
270. See discussion supra Part II.A.
271. See discussion supra Part II.A..
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benefit of being able to maintain its listing on one of the largest
stock exchanges in the country. 272 Moreover, the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines considers the Code's antiretaliation promise an essential part of an "effective compliance
system" that may lead to substantially reduced criminal penal273
ties should a company ever violate criminal statutes.
This distinction between the internal use of an employee
handbook and the external focus of a Code suggests two approaches to strengthen contract enforcement of Code antiretaliation promises, both of which are discussed in more detail
below. The first is doctrinal. Advocates and courts should recognize that the handbook doctrine's requirements apply less
persuasively to Code anti-retaliation promises because the
Code promise differs in both substance and form from typical
handbook statements. As a result, the anti-retaliation promise
ought to be considered under principles reserved for express
contracts rather than the implied contractual foundation of the
handbook doctrine.
Specifically, courts should consider a
Code's anti-retaliation promise as a contract for specific treatment in a specific situation. Moreover, to the extent courts insist on examining these promises under the handbook doctrine,
courts should recognize that the distinctive nature of the Code
promise requires courts to relax the doctrine's "reliance" element and not require an employee to rely specifically upon the
promise in order to receive protection.
The second approach is regulatory. As an initial matter, a
requirement that employers notify employees of the Code antiretaliation promise may help make the promise more enforceable by increasing the likelihood that an employee relies upon
the promise when blowing the whistle. Moreover, regulation
likely could reduce the incentive for a company to include a disclaimer in its Code, a behavior that inappropriately undermines the role of anti-retaliation protection in the overall corporate governance system.

272. See supra text accompanying notes 104-112 (describing exchange rules of
the NYSE and the NASDAQ).
273. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(5)(C) (2004).
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Doctrinal Solutions
1.

The Anti-retaliation Promise as an Express
Contract

In traditional handbook cases, at-will employees generally
attempt to enforce broad statements regarding long-term employment or limits on an employer's right to discharge an employee, such as a detailed progressive discipline program. 274
Although these handbook provisions generally do not satisfy
many of the contractual formalities of offer, acceptance, and
consideration, courts recognize that these handbook statements
may create reasonable expectations in employees that might
lead to an enforceable obligation. 27 5 As a result, under the
handbook doctrine, courts typically find that many contract
elements are implied rather than expressly intended by the
parties: the handbook contains an implied offer and the court
finds acceptance and consideration implied from the employee's
continued work. 276 Under a promissory estoppel theory that
requires reasonable reliance on a promise rather than an exchange of consideration, courts either require individualized reliance or consider the reliance requirement satisfied by implication from the handbook's general distribution. 27 7
However, relying on implications rather than express
agreements creates an uneasy fit between the handbook doctrine and employment-at-will. When the default employment
relationship permits discharge for any reason, courts may have
difficulty finding implied promissory obligations from the employer to the employee. Thus, in some jurisdictions, the elements of specificity and reliance can take on disproportionate
influence, and disclaimers can lead unquestionably to dismissal
of employee claims. 2 78 Other jurisdictions simply refuse to ac274. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 268, at 9-10.
275. See Befort, supra note 216, at 340-47, 370-72.
276. Id. at 342-43, 370; Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 216, at 344 ("Because implied-in-fact arguments rely on the representations and reasonable expectations of the parties they can be thought of more as a less rigid application of
traditional contract principles, rather than as an exception to contract principles.").
277. See Befort, supra note 216, at 371.
278. For example, some courts require a very specific promise to make up for
the lack of an intended offer. Others require individualized employee reliance on
the handbook to balance the lack of formal contractual acceptance. Finally, many
courts broadly enforce employer disclaimers, which seems to give voice to the assumption that employers rarely intend to be bound by their handbook provisions.
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cept the handbook doctrine. 2 79 Indeed, looking broadly at the
cases in the previous Part, when employees try to enforce a
corporate Code's anti-retaliation provision through implied
contract principles, these doctrinal hurdles can lead to mixed
28 0
results for employees.
Rather than continuing to analyze Code claims under the
handbook doctrine, courts should recognize that a claim of retaliation for whistleblowing often rests on the breach of an express, rather than implied, contract contained in the corporate
Code. This contract may be either unilateral or bilateral. A
unilateral contract can be formed when one party makes a
promise that can be accepted by performance from another
party. Codes often contain very specific promises dependent on
acceptance from an employee through performance: the employer promises not to retaliate if the employee engages in the
performance of reporting misconduct. As with any unilateral
contract, the consideration is the performance: blowing the
whistle. By contrast, a bilateral contract involves an exchange
of promises, which may be formed by some Code provisions in
which employers require employees to report any misconduct
that they witness. The employer promises not to retaliate in
exchange for the employee promise to report any misconduct as
part of their employment duties.
Courts in the state of Washington have developed a doctrine that expresses this idea nicely: an employee may bring a
claim for breach of a promise of specific treatment in a specific
situation. 2 8 1 Although the Washington court found that this
doctrine rested on promissory estoppel principles, 28 2 the rule is
better viewed as a description of an express contract. Rather
than lump anti-retaliation promises in with vague handbook

279. See Dau-Schmidt & Haley, supra note 216, at 344 n.119 (noting that nine
jurisdictions either do not allow or have not decided whether employees can enforce promises made in employee handbooks).
280. See discussion supra Part III.
281. See Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 128 (Wash.
2005); accord Corluka v. Bridgford Foods of Ill., 671 N.E.2d 814 (111. App. Ct.
1996) (finding a valid contract based on an employer's promise that no one would
be penalized for reporting harassment). The Washington Supreme Court explained the rationale for enforcing such promises in an earlier case: "[I]f an employer,
for whatever reason, creates an atmosphere of job security and fair treatment
with promises of specific treatment in specific situations and an employee is induced thereby to remain on the job and not actively seek other employment, those
promises are enforceable components of the employment relationship." Thompson
v. St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984).
282. See Korslund, 125 P.3d at 128.
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promises of lifetime employment and rigid progressive disciplinary systems, advocates should accentuate and courts should
recognize the differences between the two types of employer
statements. In contrast to the vague promises of long-term
employment litigated in many handbook cases, a corporate
Code's anti-retaliation promise can involve an express exchange of consideration regarding one specific aspect of an employee's work. The employee promises to or actually does report misconduct and, in return, the employer promises not to
retaliate against the employee. In other words, a specific promise (i.e., no retaliation) in a specific situation (when an employee blows the whistle).
Framing the issue as a breach of an express, rather than
an implied, contract may persuade some courts to enforce the
anti-retaliation promise when they normally would not enforce
a promise under the handbook doctrine. Under the implied
contract or promissory estoppel theories of the handbook doctrine, courts have legitimate concerns about holding employers
liable for long-lasting promises that the employer never intended to make and that greatly restrict employer discretion.
Anti-retaliation promises present less of this type of danger because they do not guarantee life-time tenure or initiate a rigid
disciplinary process. Moreover, an anti-retaliation promise
likely expresses the employer's intent to be bound because of
the many legal advantages employers receive from making
such a promise, including benefits under the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines and the ability to list corporate shares
with the country's major stock exchanges. 28 3 Further, to be
protected by the anti-retaliation promise, employees make an
affirmative act in response to the promise, as opposed to the
handbook doctrine, which often implies acceptance and consideration when the employee simply continues to perform at
work. Recognizing the difference between the two types of
promises underscores the true exchange of consideration that
occurs when an employee blows the whistle after an employer
promises not to retaliate.
2.

The Handbook Doctrine and Reliance

Some jurisdictions may be unwilling to consider a Code's
anti-retaliation promise as an express contract because of re283.

See discussion supra Part II.A.
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luctance to find contractual commitments in the face of the atwill doctrine. Moreover, not all factual circumstances will fit
neatly into the express contract theory. 284 In these cases,
courts likely will continue to utilize the handbook doctrine and
advocates will continue to face the large hurdle of proving em2 85
ployee reliance on the anti-retaliation promise.
For some cases in which the employee can claim that he or
she relied on anti-retaliation promise, this element should not
present a problem. The current handbook cases overwhelmingly permit claims with a showing of individualized reli2 86
ance.
However, a likely alternative scenario will be that a whistleblower reports misconduct without any knowledge of an
anti-retaliation promise made in the employer's Code. In many
jurisdictions, an implied contract or promissory estoppel claim
would fail because the lack of individualized employee reliance
28 7
undermines the acceptance and consideration elements.
To solve this problem doctrinally, courts should rethink
this "individualized reliance" requirement as applied to Code
anti-retaliation provisions. Instead, to recognize the larger
corporate governance role played by Code anti-retaliation provisions, these courts should infer reliance from the general
publication of a Code. Although some courts, most notably the

284. For example, the express contract argument may apply only when a Code
contains a specific promise not to retaliate, as opposed to a more general policy of
punishing retaliators or encouraging whistleblowers to come forward. Additionally, because a strict contract interpretation may require a party to have knowledge of an offer in order to accept it, some courts may require that the whistleblower know about the Code provision and report the misconduct because of the
anti-retaliation promise.
285. The "specificity" element of the handbook doctrine will be a relatively
small hurdle under the new listing standards. As mentioned above, many Codes
now contain very specific anti-retaliation promises because generalized "policy"
statements likely do not satisfy the new NYSE and NASD listing standards. See
discussion supra Part II.A. The new generation of anti-retaliation promises required by the NYSE and the NASD would appear to be "specific enough" to satisfy
the handbook doctrine's requirements. See discussion supra Part II.A. However,
a few jurisdictions, like West Virginia and Colorado, continue to insist that even
these specific promises are too general. Although advocates should highlight the
differences between these promises and general policy statements as discussed
above, whistleblowers simply may not have the ability to rely on Code promises in
these states until the law changes.
286. See, e.g., Loli v. Standard Chartered Bank, 160 Fed. App'x 20, at *2 (2d
Cir. 2005); Narvarte v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., No. 96-Civ.-8133
(JGK)(SEG), 1998 WL 690059, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 2, 1998).
287. See, e.g., Korslund v. DynCorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 131
(Wash. 2005); see also Befort, supra note 216, at 344-45.
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court in Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,28 8 have accepted generalized reliance in a typical handbook case, the distinctive nature of the new Code promises may provide a
stronger argument for a broader adoption of this rationale in
289
retaliation cases.
The Toussaint court relied on two characteristics of employee handbooks to justify inferring reliance from the general
publication of an employee handbook, even if the plaintiffemployee never actually relied on the handbook. First, as
noted above, 2 90 employers receive significant benefits from distributing an employee handbook, including increased employee
productivity, improved loyalty, better compliance with workplace rules, and enhanced employee morale. 2 9 1 Second, these
benefits often result directly from encouraging employee expectations regarding the statements in a handbook. 2 92 As the
Michigan Supreme Court later articulated, handbook promises
should be enforced if they create an "environment conducive to
collective productivity" because of increased employee expecta3
tions. 29
a.

Employer Benefits from Code Anti-retaliation
Promises

The benefits to an employer of publishing a Code surpass
the benefits a corporation receives from an employee handbook
generally, as set forth by the Toussaint court. For example,
when employees feel free to report corporate wrongdoing with288. 292 N.W.2d 880, 892-95 (Mich. 1980).
289. Some commentators also refer to this concept as "employer estoppel,"
meaning that employers make unilateral statements in their self-interest and,
therefore, the statements should be binding on the employer. See RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.04 cmt. b (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 2007).
290. See supratext accompanying notes 269-73.
291. See, e.g., In re Certified Question: Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co., 443
N.W.2d 112, 119 (Mich. 1989); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d
880, 892-95 (Mich. 1980) ("The employer secures an orderly, cooperative and loyal
work force, and the employee the peace of mind associated with job security and
the conviction that he will be treated fairly."); Befort, supra note 216, at 337-38;
Berks, supra note 269, at 265-68; Farber & Matheson, supra note 269, at 921 n.77
(1985); Levy, supra note 217, at 721; Schmedemann & Parks, supra note 221, at
666 (citing studies that indicate employer policies may increase employee loyalty).
292. See, e.g., Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 892-95; Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Co., 685 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Wash. 1984) (noting that, by expecting employees to
comply with policy manuals, employers "create an atmosphere" in which employees reasonably expect employers to abide by the policies); Befort, supra note 216,
at 338-39.
293. In re Certified Question: Bankey, 443 N.W.2d at 119.
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out fear of retaliation, the corporation itself benefits from a
more ethical corporate climate. 294 This environment should, in
295
turn, improve employee morale and boost productivity.
These benefits primarily relate to the corporation's internal community of employees. As mentioned earlier, however,
Code promises also lead to increased benefits related to a corporation's external constituencies because of the very public
nature of these commitments. By publishing in its annual report and on its website a promise not to retaliate against employees, a corporation assures nervous shareholders and curious government regulators that the company encourages its
employees to report misconduct. 2 96 Corporations typically do
not make their employee handbooks publicly available to the
same extent as Code provisions, and therefore handbook promises likely do not result in a similar gain in goodwill from external corporate constituencies. The external benefits companies receive from Code anti-retaliation promises also include
those mentioned previously: the ability to list a company's
shares on national stock exchanges and potential penalty reductions under the federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines. 297 Further, by promising not to retaliate against an employee whistleblower when the whistleblower discloses via the
publicized channel, an employer may avoid an employee reporting misconduct externally, which can lead to greater costs than
2 98
if the employee reports internally.

294. See Hess, supra note 76, at 1802-03; Moberly, supra note 7, at 1159.
295. See Callahan et al., supra note 86, at 196 (asserting that increased employee morale occurs "when employees understand that they can stop wrongful
conduct and contribute to shaping a working environment in which they can take
pride").
296. Cf. Amitai Aviram, In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs, 32 FLA.
ST. L. REV. 763, 770 (2005) (noting that "[c]orporations are spending vast
amounts of money on [compliance] programs that are intended to persuade the
public that they do not violate norms held by their patrons or employees");
Besmer, supra note 199, at 280 ("A private code of conduct enhances such a [corporate social responsibility] commitment by adding an air of formality. It articulates the standards by which a corporation professes to be bound."); Emily F.
Carasco & Jang B. Singh, The Content and Focus of the Codes of Ethics of the
World's Largest TransnationalCorporations,108 BUS. & SOC'Y REV. 71, 72 (2003);
Newberg, supra note 95, at 269-70; Eaton & Akers, supra note 96, at 70 ("A whistleblower policy and effective enforcement has the potential not only to significantly reduce fraudulent activity but also to send a signal to both internal and external constituencies that the organization exercises good corporate governance.").
297. See supra discussion accompanying notes 272-73.
298. See Moberly, supra note 7, at 1151-52 (discussing corporate benefits of
internal reporting compared to whistleblower disclosures made externally).
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Employee Expectations

Codes also exist as part of an overall regulatory system
that may drive employees to expect protection from retaliation.
Even if an employee does not directly rely on a Code's antiretaliation promise, employees receive substantial other signals that the corporation encourages whistleblowing and will
protect whistleblowers. A survey completed in the early 1990s
found that seventy percent of large corporate respondents had
a formal internal disclosure policy for whistleblowers to use
when reporting misconduct. 299 Moreover, as mentioned above,
numerous outside regulatory regimes provide corporations incentives to implement effective internal compliance systems,
such that today nearly all publicly-traded corporations have
whistleblower policies. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires that
companies install a whistleblower disclosure channel so that
employees can report wrongdoing directly to a corporation's
Board of Directors. 300 Companies often post signs providing
the phone number for the whistleblower hotline.
Although these compliance regimes have been criticized for
being superficial, 301 employees nevertheless may take them seriously and develop expectations based upon them. In other
words, when evaluating employee expectations, the existence of
the compliance system matters, not its quality. These compliance efforts, of which the Code is an important part, send the
message that whistleblowing is permitted, encouraged, and expected. 30 2 Even if an employee never reads the specific antiretaliation promise contained in the Code, the unspoken message of these numerous compliance efforts includes an understanding that any employee who witnesses misconduct will not
face retaliation for reporting it.303 Indeed, Professor Pauline
Kim reports that seventy-nine percent of employee-respondents
299. See Barnett et al., supra note 96, at 129-31.
300. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)(4)(A)
(Supp. IV 2004).

301. See, e.g., Krawiec, supra note 73, at 489-91.
302. See Arthurs, supra note 198, at 53 (discussing the "symbolic" significance
of Codes); cf. Hess, supra note 76, at 180 ('The presence of a compliance program
helps potential whistleblowers believe that they will be satisfied with the consequences of reporting.").
303. See Bird, supra note 214, at 170, 177-78 (arguing that corporate codes are
an important part of the "relational contract" between an employer and an employee, and that such policies and procedures should be examined when determining whether an employee reasonably relies on his or her relationship with an employer to protect the employee from discharge).
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to her survey incorrectly believed that an employer cannot fire
an employee who reports theft of property by another to a supervisor. 30 4 Companies may lure employees into a sense of security regarding their protection from retaliation simply by
providing an internal disclosure channel for whistleblowers.
The combination of the benefits employers receive for publishing a Code anti-retaliation promise and the heightened expectations among employees driven by corporate compliance efforts provide exactly the type of environment-"instinct with
an obligation"-discussed by the Toussaint court. 30 5 This atmosphere led the Toussaint court to infer individualized reliance from a similar generalized understanding of protection.
Given this strong similarity, courts should adopt the Toussaint
inference for Code anti-retaliation promises if an employee did
not actually rely on a specific Code provision. Anti-retaliation
promises appearing in Codes that employers publish in annual
reports, corporate filings, or on the internet should be considered enforceable regardless of whether an individual whistleblower actually saw and relied upon the promise. Applying the
Toussaint approach to anti-retaliation Code promises would
enhance fairness by recognizing the benefits corporations receive for publicizing Codes and the expectations employees
have from corporate compliance efforts generally.
C. Regulatory Solutions
Several regulatory solutions also may assist in the contractual enforcement of Code anti-retaliation promises. The first
relates to the issue just discussed: whether an employee actually relies on the promise when disclosing misconduct.
1.

Requiring Notice to Employees

In order to minimize the number of cases in which whistleblowers failed to know of or rely upon a Code's anti-retaliation
promise, companies should be required to provide notice of the
Code to employees. While most companies post the Code on
their website, 30 6 employers also should distribute it regularly
304. See Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
105, 134 (1997).
305. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 892 (Mich. 1980).
306. See Moberly, supra note 110 (finding that ninety-seven percent of compa-
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to employees and highlight the Code's anti-retaliation provision
to ensure that it is not drowned out by the other information
employers provide to employees.
For example, employers
should provide notice of the anti-retaliation promise in the
same place and manner in which they post notice of how to
make a whistleblower disclosure. In other words, posters that
inform employees of a company's whistleblower hotline should
also indicate that no retaliation will occur against any employee who utilizes the hotline.
Either Congress, the SEC, or the individual stock exchanges could impose the disclosure requirement. Additionally, agencies or courts that give incentives to corporations for
implementing internal compliance systems could mandate the
notice as a requirement for receiving the incentive. For example, part of the analysis for a penalty reduction under the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines could include a requirement that any internal compliance system must provide broad
notice to employees of the company's anti-retaliation promise
in order to be considered "effective." Such a disclosure requirement would not prove onerous to corporations because
they already provide employees with a tremendous amount of
information when it is in the corporation's interest. This additional requirement would simply mandate that they highlight
the anti-retaliation promise as part of this informational process.
SEC regulations and the stock exchanges already require
disclosure to shareholders and government regulators of the
fact that an anti-retaliation promise exists. 30 7 Yet, employee
ignorance about the promise does not serve the purpose behind
the promise: encouraging employees to become whistleblowers.
Indeed, without employee knowledge of the promise, disclosing
the promise to shareholders and the government appears deceiving. The government and shareholders may believe that
employees feel safe to report misconduct when in reality employees do not know that they would be protected if they blew
the whistle. Moreover, should an employee blow the whistle
anyway, the employee would not succeed in a subsequent contract claim based on the anti-retaliation promise if the employee did not know specifically about the promise at the time
the employee blew the whistle, further undermining the effec-

nies placed the Code on their website).
307.

See discussion supra Part II.A.
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tiveness of the compliance system. In short, without a notice
requirement, the compliance system would appear stronger to
external constituencies than it actually operates in practice.
Accordingly, the government and the stock exchanges should
require that corporations disclose and emphasize any Code
anti-retaliation promise to their employees.
2.

Rethinking Disclaimers

Two other regulatory suggestions relate to the powerful
role that disclaimers play in litigation over the enforceability of
anti-retaliation promises. Under either the express or the implied contract theory, the ability of an employer to disclaim any
anti-retaliation promise may make a Code's anti-retaliation
promise unenforceable. Interestingly given the power of at-will
disclaimers, less than half (46.7%) of the Codes in the NYSE
study contained them. 30 8 Although other employment documents may contain a disclaimer, some courts hold that, to be
effective, a disclaimer must appear in the same document as
the anti-retaliation promise. 309 Also, in cases involving handbook promises more generally, courts often do not enforce an
at-will disclaimer in similar situations in which a promise appears in one document and the disclaimer appears in another. 3 10 In these cases, some courts deny summary judgment
because a question of fact exists regarding the effect of the disclaimer. 3 11 Thus, in the near future, the lack of disclaimers in
Codes may permit employees to avoid this employer defense to
either an express or implied breach of contract action, even if
an at-will disclaimer appears elsewhere in the employment materials.
Yet, ultimately, the almost universal ability of a disclaimer
to negate an employer's promise may pose long-term difficulties
308. See Moberly, supra note 110.
309. See, e.g., Greene v. Quest Diagnostics Clinical Labs., Inc., 455 F. Supp. 2d
483, 486 (D.S.C. 2006) (finding that a jury must determine whether an antiretaliation promise was binding because the promise was not accompanied by an
at-will disclaimer); Korslund v. Dyncorp Tri-Cities Servs., Inc., 125 P.3d 119, 12930 (Wash. 2005) (finding that an at-will disclaimer on an employment application
did not preclude employee reliance on an anti-retaliation promise in the employee
handbook); Nichols v. Xerox Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 847, 848 (N.Y. App. Div. 2003)
(holding that Code of Ethics may be enforceable even though a separate employee
manual contained an at-will disclaimer because the Code of Ethics itself did not
contain a disclaimer).
310. See Befort, supra note 216, at 365-68.
311. See id.
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for whistleblowers who attempt to enforce a Code's antiretaliation promise. 3 12 Eventually employers will add disclaimers to Codes to avoid contract liability. Indeed, we have seen
this before: courts enforce a handbook promise, but provide
employers a defense if they make clear that these promises do
not negate the background at-will basis of the employment relationship. 3 13 Subsequently, employers learned to draft policies
that included at-will language negating the ability of employ3 14
ees to bring contract-based claims in an at-will relationship.
As Professor Franklin Snyder notes, "employers have good
lawyers, and given enough time, good lawyers can get around
3 15
every contract problem."
Wal-Mart already has learned this lesson. As we saw earlier, Wal-Mart's Statement of Ethics contains an extraordinarily broad anti-retaliation promise. 3 16 However, on the first
page of this same document, Wal-Mart asserts that the Statement "is not intended to create an express or implied contract
of employment in and of itself. . . Employment at Wal-Mart is
on an at-will basis." 3 17 The sample Code of Business Ethics &
Conduct published by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners also exemplifies this dilemma. The Code claims to
"strictly prohibit[ ]"reprisal against whistleblowers, but it also
reaffirms the corporation's right to terminate employment "at
any time, with or without cause." 3 18 Similarly, the NYSE re312. See Fineman, supra note 268, at 40 ("Over time, courts became increasingly likely to value employers' express disclaimer or at-will provision over employees' assertion that employers' conduct gave rise to an implied understanding
of job security.").
313. See Wooley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257 (N.J. 1985), modified, 499 A.2d 515 (1985). As the court noted in one of the first handbook cases:
What is sought here is basic honesty: if the employer, for whatever reason, does not want the manual to be capable of being construed by the
court as a binding contract, there are simple ways to attain that goal.
All that need be done is the inclusion in a very prominent position of an
appropriate statement that there is no promise of any kind by the employer contained in the manual . . . and that the employer continues to
have the absolute power to fire anyone with or without good cause.
Id. at 1271.
314. See Fineman, supra note 268, at 5-6, 26-34; Fischl, supra note 56, at 195
(noting that after courts announced the handbook rule, employers "rewrote materials to opt back into the employment-at-will rule via disclaimers of job security").
315. Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships
on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WES. L. REV. 33, 64 (2003).
316. See supra text accompanying notes 108-09.
317. See Wal-Mart Statement of Ethics, supra note 108, at i.
318. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAMINERS, SAMPLE CODE OF
BUSINESS ETHICS & CONDUCT, 1 (2003), available at http://www.acfe.com
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quires companies to include anti-retaliation protections as part
of a Code, but also states in the commentary to another part of
that rule that "[1]isted companies may write their Codes in a
manner that does not alter existing legal rights and obligations
of companies and their employees, such as 'at will' employment
arrangements." 3 19 This caveat is contained in the section discussing an employer's duty to deal fairly with an employeenot the anti-retaliation section. However, the comment serves
as a reminder of the effect of the background at-will rule on
any discussion of enforceable employment promises.
Two regulatory changes would counteract the willingness
of an employer to simply add a disclaimer to the antiretaliation provisions of a Code. First, any disclaimer should
eliminate the ability of the employer to receive a benefit from
the anti-retaliation promise. As mentioned above, an employer
utilizes an anti-retaliation promise for several reasons, including to receive a benefit under the Organizational Sentencing
Guidelines by having an "effective compliance system" and,
most recently, to satisfy the listing standards of a stock exchange. 320 Prosecutors and courts should refuse to give sentencing reductions and credits to a corporation that includes an
at-will disclaimer in its Code, at least as the disclaimer relates
to provisions regarding whistleblowers. A compliance system
can hardly be "effective" if an employer can retaliate against
whistleblowers without fear of liability. Similarly, stock exchanges should de-list a company that waters down an antiretaliation promise with an at-will disclaimer. Shareholders
cannot expect to benefit from encouraging employees to become
internal monitors when a disclaimer makes an anti-retaliation
promise unenforceable.
Analogous arguments in favor of this suggestion exist in
the sexual harassment context. In order for an employer to
utilize the Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense for such cases,
it must demonstrate that its anti-harassment compliance procedure is "effectively enforced" and that an employee unreasonably failed to utilize the procedure. 32 1 Courts have held
that an employer can lose that affirmative defense if the employer retaliates against an employee who utilizes the procedocuments/code of business..ethics.pdf.
319. See NYSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS § 303A.10 cmt. (2004).
320. See discussion supra Part II.A.
321. See, e.g., White v. BFI Waste Servs., LLC, 375 F.3d 288, 299 (4th Cir.
2004).
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dure or even if the anti-harassment policy does not contain sufficient promises against retaliation. 322 As the Fourth Circuit
noted, "[e]mployers who trap employees by firing those who use
their antiharassment reporting procedures could very well lose
their affirmative defense in cases where employees do not report suspected violations." 323 Although courts have not evaluated specifically the effect of a handbook disclaimer on an employer's affirmative defense, 324 employees seemingly would
have a strong argument that a policy that disclaims its own
promises cannot be "effective. '32 5 The same argument should
be recognized in other contexts involving whistleblower antiretaliation provisions.
If an employer refuses to stand by its promise to protect
whistleblowers, then the employer should not receive credit for
having a compliance system in place. Under this proposal, employers either could remove such at-will disclaimers (thereby
permitting employees to enforce the company's "no retaliation"
promise), or the employer would not receive the benefits offered
by courts, prosecutors, and stock exchanges for promising antiretaliation protection.

322. See Cardenas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 267 (3d Cir. 2001) (denying summary judgment on the issue of whether a policy satisfied the Faragher/Ellerthaffirmative defense in part because of a fact question as to whether the plaintiff was
retaliated against for using a compliance system); Madison v. IBP, Inc., 257 F.3d
780, 795-96 (8th Cir. 2001) ("There was evidence that IBP did not have effective
procedures in place to encourage employees to come forward with employment
complaints or to protect them from retaliation."), overruled in non-relevantpart by
Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004) ; Barrett v. Applied Radiant Energy Corp., 240 F.3d 262, 266 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that any presumption of "reasonable care" arising from the distribution of an anti-harassment policy can be rebutted through proof that the policy was adopted or administered in
bad faith or that the policy was otherwise defective or dysfunctional); Williams v.
Spartan Commc'ns, Inc., No. 99-1566, 2000 WL 331605, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 30,
2000) (finding that employer failed to satisfy an affirmative defense because,
among other things, the employer "disseminated an anti-harassment policy which
failed to provide that complainants would be free from retaliation, and yet warned
that false reports of harassment would subject a complainant to disciplinary action, 'including termination"'); Dinkins v. Charoen Pokphand USA, Inc., 133 F.
Supp. 2d 1237, 1253-54 (M.D. Ala. 2001) ("It goes without saying a shield cannot
double as a sword; an employer may not protect itself by strewing mines throughout its safe harbor.").
323. Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp., 458 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2006).
324. See Schroeder, supra note 93, at 593 (recognizing that the presence of a
disclaimer may lead to arguments about an anti-harassment policy's effectiveness,
but asserting that litigants rarely have the incentive to litigate the issue).
325. But see id. (noting that employees rarely win cases attacking the effectiveness of an anti-harassment policy).
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A second option could be based on the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement that any waivers of Codes of Ethics provisions must
be disclosed to the public and shareholders. 326 The stock exchange listing regulations require similar disclosures when a
company waives its Code of Ethics for directors or executive officers. 32 7 The stock exchanges should extend this waiver provision to apply anytime the company relies upon a disclaimer to
defend against a whistleblower's claim of retaliation. This suggestion operates under the same rationale as the rule currently
in place for directors and executive officers: corporations should
not mislead shareholders by secretly waiving rules that have
been disclosed publicly. 3 28 Corporations should not be permitted to promise publicly not to retaliate against whistleblowers,
while also claiming in private litigation that the promise is not
329
enforceable.
Thus, while the stock exchanges' listing standards may
help employees satisfy the "specificity" requirements of the
current handbook test, 330 the "reliance" and "disclaimer" elements will remain significant stumbling blocks for employee
enforcement of these promises. If advocates, courts, and regulators recognize the distinctive nature of Code anti-retaliation
promises, however, then whistleblowers will have a better opportunity to overcome these hurdles. Doctrinally, advocates
should argue and courts should accept that that Code antiretaliation promises can be analyzed better as express rather
than implied contracts. Moreover, even under the implied contract principles of the handbook doctrine, reinvigorating the
Toussaint analysis regarding generalized "reliance" is appropriate for anti-retaliation promises that provide the employer
numerous corporate governance benefits. Regulatory changes
326. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 406, 15 U.S.C. § 1763 (Supp. 2002).
327. See NYSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS, § 303A.10; NASD Rule
4350(n).
328. Cf. NYSE, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STANDARDS, § 303A.10 cmt. (2004)
("Each code of business conduct and ethics must require that any waiver of the
code for executive officers or directors may be made only by the board or a board
committee and must be promptly disclosed to shareholders. This disclosure requirement should inhibit casual and perhaps questionable waivers, and should
help assure that, when warranted, a waiver is accompanied by appropriate controls designed to protect the listed company. It will also give shareholders the opportunity to evaluate the board's performance in granting waivers.").
329. See Richard F. Ober, Jr. & Ian Ayres, The Hollow Promise: Sexual Orientation NondiscriminationPolicies, 24 Association of Corporate Counsel Docket 48,
50 (Oct. 2006) (discussing problems with corporations that make "hollow promises" of nondiscrimination).
330. See supra note 285.
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may also help. Employers should be required to give employees
notice of the Code anti-retaliation promise. Also, employers
should not receive benefits from publishing a Code antiretaliation promise if they disclaim contractual responsibility
for the promise.
V.

THE DOWNSIDE FOR WHISTLEBLOWERS

Although bringing a contract claim may be a good option
for a whistleblower, it is not a perfect solution. At best, the
claim supplements and fills in some of the gaps created by inconsistent tort and statutory protections. Of course, given the
breadth of these gaps, this supplemental role could prove valuable. However, whistleblower advocates and policymakers also
should understand that the contract claim presents some
drawbacks compared to protection provided by torts and statutes.
A.

More Limited Damages

The contract theory of recovery likely will lead to lower
damages for whistleblowers than either a tort or statutory
claim. The tort of wrongful discharge often provides the possibility of both economic damages and non-economic damages,
such as emotional distress and mental anguish. 33 1 Courts also
often permit an employee-plaintiff to recover punitive damages. 332 Although statutory damages provisions vary considerably, 333 many anti-retaliation statutes provide compensatory 334 and punitive damages, 33 5 as well as explicit litigation
costs and attorneys' fees provisions. 33 6
By contrast, a contract claim may provide a significantly
lower damages award. First, contract damages rarely will include non-economic damages or punitive damages. 33 7 Second,
331. See LARSON, supra note 221, at § 9A.03[1][a]-[b].
332. See id. at § 9A.03[1][c].
333. See id. at § 9A.04 ("Statutory remedies are extremely varied, ranging from
those with almost no remedy at all, to those including tort-like damages for emotional distress and punitive damages.").
334. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (2000); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 23:967v (2007).
335. See, e.g., MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(2) (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
34:19-5 (2006).
336. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (Supp. IV. 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 448.103
(2007).
337. See LARSON, supra note 221, at § 9A.02[1].
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because the damages calculation for a breach of contract consists of determining "expectation damages"-that is, compensating the employee for any foreseeable loss caused by the employer's breach by placing the employee in the position the
employee would have obtained had the contract not been
breached 338-it may be difficult for an at-will employee to receive any expectation recovery. After all, an at-will employee,
by definition, should have no expectation of future employment
because the employer could terminate the employment at any
time, for any reason or no reason. Thus, some courts conclude
that at-will employees may recover only nominal damages for
breach of an at-will contract because the employee could have
been legally discharged immediately after the illegal termination. 339 Other courts conclude that damages in the at-will context are not readily ascertainable because the employee could
be fired at any moment. 340 For example, a North Carolina
court has held that an at-will employee cannot recover damages for a breach of contract action without a showing that 34the
1
employee would have been retained for some length of time.
Fortunately, courts rarely have taken such a cramped view
of damages when at-will employees bring contract-like claims.
The more common damages calculation presumes that employment would have continued but for the wrongful termination. 34 2 Under this view, a contractual claim would permit
back pay, which would make the employee "whole, ' 343 and the
back pay calculation would run from the date the employment
terminated to the date of judgment. 344 Additionally, courts
may permit reinstatement 345 and front pay, 34 6 although the
34 7
availability of these remedies is far from universal.
338. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 347 (1981).
339. See LARSON, supra note 221, at § 9A.02[4].
340. See id. at § 9A.02[4].
341. See Bennett v. Eastern Rebuilders, Inc., 279 S.E.2d 46 (N.C. App. 1981).
342. See, e.g., Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
343. See, e.g., Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 (Wis.
1983).
App. Ct.
344. See, e.g., Pokora v. Warehouse Direct, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 1204 (Ill.
2001).
345. See, e.g., Brockmeyer, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
346. See, e.g., Duder v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Futures, Inc., 3 I.E.R.
Cases 97 (D. Minn. 1986); Torosyan v. Boehringer Ingelheim Pharm., Inc., 662
A.2d 89 (Conn. 1995); Smith v. Smithway Motor Xpress, Inc., 464 N.W.2d 682
(Iowa 1990).
347. See, e.g., Jeter v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Okla.
1976); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Oxford, 743 S.W.2d 380, 386-87 (Ark. 1988) (permitting back pay from the day of termination to the day of trial, but refusing to
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The doctrinal differences in available remedies between
contract claims on the one hand and tort and statutory claims
on the other have an impact in the real world. One study reported that the average tort retaliatory discharge award outpaced the average employment breach of contract claim by almost $400,000.348 This sizable difference may cause attorneys
to refuse to take a contract claim because it may not be costeffective, particularly for a lower-wage worker. Moreover, the
lack of a "full" damages award that would include punitive
damages and damages for mental anguish or pain and suffering may not give employees sufficient incentive to become
34 9
whistleblowers in the first place.
B.

No Claims Against Individuals

Some anti-retaliation statutes permit whistleblowers to
bring claims against individuals who retaliate against them, as
well as their employer. For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
states that no officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or
agent of a publicly-traded company may discriminate against
an employee for blowing the whistle. 3 50 Administrative law
judges hold that employees may bring Sarbanes-Oxley claims
directly against individuals who retaliated against them.3 5 1
By contrast, whistleblowers likely could not bring a breach
of contract claim based on a Code anti-retaliation promise
against individuals. The employer's issuance of the Code likely
would make it the proper defendant and exclude any claim
352
against an individual manager or executive.
Interestingly, although Sarbanes-Oxley permits whistleblowers to bring claims against individuals, 353 they rarely did

award future damages); WILLBORN et al., supra note 9, at 185 (noting that courts
are "reluctant to order reinstatement" in common law tort and contract cases).
348. See LARSON, supra note 221, at § 9A.01 (citing study of 326 California
cases in the 1980s which found that the average retaliatory discharge award was
$579,974 and the average breach of contract award was $193,898).
349. See Dworkin, supra note 169, at 1763.
350. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
351. See Jordan v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 2006-SOX-41 (Dep't of Labor Mar. 14,
2006); Gallagher v. Granada Entert. USA, 2004-SOX-74 (Dep't of Labor Oct. 19,
2004).
352. See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 11, at 151-52 ("Typically, actions
for breach of contract may be pursued against only parties to the contract, which
in the employment context includes the employing entity but not individual managers.").
353. See 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (Supp. IV 2004).
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so, 354 perhaps because the employer provides a substantially
Moreover, employment-related tort claims
deeper pocket.
against individuals, while possible, rarely succeed. 3 55 Thus,
the practical effect of this difference between contract and
statutory protections may be minimal. However, at the margins, the option of including individual managers and executives as defendants could deter them from retaliating against
whistleblowers. The failure of the breach of contract theory to
permit this type of claim reduces the level of this deterrence.

C. Requiring InternalDisclosure
Finally, to the extent courts accept breach of contract
claims based on Code anti-retaliation promises, employers will
react in ways to reduce their liability. In addition to adding a
disclaimer, 35 6 another possible reaction may be that employers
will impose procedural requirements for anti-retaliation protection. An employer may condition its promise not to retaliate on
the whistleblower reporting misconduct internally or to a specific source. Employees who fail to follow these instructions
will be forced to overcome the argument that the employee did
not satisfy a condition precedent to protection. Employers
might be able to justify such requirements on the ground that
the company needs a standardized means of receiving reports
in order to control rogue agents who might retaliate against
whistleblowers without authorization.
Court reaction to this gambit will likely vary depending on
the facts of the case, such as whether the employee received notice of the procedural requirement and whether the procedure
was reasonable under the circumstances. For whistleblowers,
such requirements will erect more procedural hurdles to overcome. But, the consequences may not be entirely negative.
Whistleblowers who actually utilize the procedure may experience less retaliation because they would be protected by the
corporation's official compliance system rather than exposed to
the whims of managers and supervisors. 3 57 Moreover, the re354. In a study I conducted of 491 Sarbanes-Oxley whistleblower claims, employees named an individual as a respondent in only 5.3% of the cases. The general results from this study were published in Moberly, supra note 10; however,
this specific data was not included in the published results.
355. See WESTMAN & MODESIIT, supra note 11, at 152 (citing cases).
356. See discussion supra Part IV.C.2.
357. Some social science research suggests that whistleblowers who report misconduct internally experience retaliation less frequently than whistleblowers who
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quirements could encourage internal whistleblowing, which
has numerous societal advantages, including permitting an
early response to misconduct and an overall reduction in the
358
harm from corporate wrongdoing.
CONCLUSION

Recommending a contractual solution to an employment
problem can be quixotic. If the proposed contract terms infringe too much upon employer prerogatives by undermining
the at-will rule, then employers will simply change the terms of
the bargain. 3 59 Employers will add disclaimers to handbooks,
narrow the scope of their promises, or remove their promissory
statements altogether. However, the anti-retaliation promises
in Codes may withstand these attempts because the benefits
employers receive from issuing such promises likely outweigh
the costs of increased exposure to whistleblower claims. Employers can list their stocks on the country's largest stock exchanges, receive reduced criminal sanctions, better defend
against employee harassment claims, and send a message of
"good corporate governance" to their shareholders and regulators.
Less visibly, perhaps, employers that take antiretaliation promises seriously should reduce their own wrongdoing by encouraging more employee monitoring.
Nonetheless, permitting contractual enforcement of these
anti-retaliation promises does not optimally encourage whistleblowers. The damages remedy may not be sufficient, particularly for lower-wage workers, and the anti-retaliation
promise will vary from corporation to corporation. Eventually,
broader statutory and tort protections may be necessary in order to provide more universal and consistent protection. But
until then, permitting whistleblowers to enforce a corporate
promise not to retaliate through a breach of contract action
could serve as a valuable supplemental remedy for and deterrent to retaliation. Contractual enforcement can protect whistleblowers who fall through the gaps of current statutory and
tort coverage, and many employees and their attorneys will
likely consider any recovery better than no recovery at all.
report to a source outside of the organization. See Terry Morehead Dworkin &
Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Internal Whistleblowing: Protectingthe Interests of the
Employee, the Organization,and Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 301-02 (1991).
358. See Moberly, supra note 10, at 1151-52.
359. See Snyder, supra note 315, at 64.

